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Introduction: Overview of the project 
This Discussion Paper provides background research relevant to the development of a 
voluntary code of practice for disinformation and is a companion document to the draft 
Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation (‘the Code’) being released for public 
consultation. Over time, digital platforms have introduced measures to counter 
disinformation and enable the public to make informed decisions in relation to content; the 
Code provides an opportunity to develop a common set of principles and commitments in 
relation to this work by platforms and to build on existing efforts. 
The development of this Code has been driven by the Digital Industry Group Inc. (DIGI). DIGI 
is a non-profit industry association that advocates for the interests of the digital industry in 
Australia, with Google, Facebook, Twitter and Verizon Media as its founding members. DIGI 
also has an associate membership program and our other members include Redbubble, 
eBay, GoFundMe and Change.org. DIGI’s vision is a thriving Australian digitally enabled 
economy that fosters innovation, a growing selection of digital products and services, and 
where online safety and privacy are protected.  
DIGI commissioned the Centre for Media Transition (CMT) at University of Technology 
Sydney to assist with the preparation of the Code and the Discussion Paper. CMT, an 
interdisciplinary research centre that investigates key areas of media evolution and digital 
transition, drew on the assistance of First Draft, a global organisation that empowers 
societies with the knowledge, understanding and tools needed to outsmart false and 
misleading information. 
This work is being undertaken as part of DIGI’s response to Government policy as set out 
in Regulating in the Digital Age: Government Response and Implementation Roadmap for the 
Digital Platforms Inquiry, developed following the ACCC’s Digital Platforms Inquiry. The 
Roadmap states:  
The Government will ask the major digital platforms to develop a voluntary code (or 
codes) of conduct for disinformation and news quality. The Australian 
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) will have oversight of the codes and 
report to Government on the adequacy of platforms’ measures and the broader 
impacts of disinformation.   
The codes will address concerns regarding disinformation and credibility signalling for 
news content and outline what the platforms will do to tackle disinformation on their 
services and support the ability of Australians to discern the quality of news and 
information. The codes will be informed by learnings of international examples, such 
as the European Union Code of Practice on Disinformation. The Government will 
assess the success of the codes and consider the need for any further reform in 2021. 
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The project involves research on existing approaches to managing disinformation and 
consultation with the digital industry on platforms’ own initiatives for addressing the 
problem. 
This paper provides background and context to help industry participants, government and 
the community consider how they can work together to tackle the issue of disinformation 
and misinformation, while at the same time promoting the value of free speech in an open 
democratic society. It covers: 
• the concept of disinformation and how it relates to misinformation 
• relevant industry initiatives  
• international initiatives – regulation in other jurisdictions. 
By considering different ways of defining disinformation and various international 
approaches to regulation, we hope this paper helps to reveal the different dimensions of 
disinformation and some of the challenges for regulation.  
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1 Information disorder: the background 
for an Australian code of practice 
Aim of this paper 
There are complex issues that arise in approaching the topic of disinformation and 
misinformation. Foundational questions – such as what to regulate and who should be the 
subject of regulation – are being confronted internationally. Naturally, there are differing 
views about some of these matters, but in order to reach an effective and proportionate 
regulatory outcome, these views need to be considered. Some of the specific challenges 
involved in designing regulation in this area include: 
• the choices that must be made in defining disinformation – including the type of 
‘harms’ which are included within that concept; 
• the risks to freedom of speech, including political communication, that may arise in 
the course of taking action in relation to content; 
• the difficulties of setting regulatory initiatives at a national level for issues that affect 
a range of industry participants and consumers across multiple jurisdictions; 
• the need to combine regulatory approaches with other initiatives to raise awareness 
and media literacy or to encourage factual accuracy in news reporting; 
• how regulation can encourage a sense of shared responsibility among the 
community, government, content producers and digital platforms.  
The aim of this paper is to inform discussion about the complexities and potential 
challenges when responding to online disinformation in the Australian regulatory context. It 
seeks to explore these issues and provide some background and guidance for DIGI in 
developing its voluntary industry code of practice. 
A threshold challenge is identifying what constitutes disinformation and differentiating it 
from other content and conduct which is the subject of regulation.  
Approaches to the regulation of speech, including online speech, vary across jurisdictions. In 
Australia, liability can arise in relation to content and conduct such as violent live-streamed 
material, cyberbullying and image-based abuse, defamation, misleading and deceptive 
content and even inaccurate news. The sources of regulation include national security 
legislation, criminal law, communications regulation and various forms of voluntary, 
industry-based regulation. These various forms of existing regulation show that 
responsibility for addressing content and conduct that can be harmful is likely to be shared 
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across a range of participants. This includes, at various points, suppliers of communications 
access and infrastructure, services providers including digital platforms, content producers 
and users of online service. In the case of defamation law, for example, liability might be 
shared across a content creator such as a news media outlet, a social media service used to 
distribute the content, and users who post comments against news articles. As the 
Australian Government’s Implementation Roadmap showed, regulation in this field is still 
evolving. 
In the context of this multiplicity in sources of regulation, this section tries to identify 
disinformation as a distinct category of content or conduct.  We preface this with some 
additional context by briefly considering some research on community understanding of the 
problem in Australia. After giving an explanation about some of the complexities involved in 
deciding on appropriate terminology, we then look at some specific challenges in fashioning 
a definition of disinformation, before outlining some specific ways in which disinformation 
manifests, including in Australia. We end this section by looking at some aspects of news 
credibility.  
Australians’ perceptions of information disorder   
In the Digital News Report (DNR) for 2020, 64% of Australians reported high levels of concern 
about misinformation.1 This has been consistently high since 2018, and ranks Australia as 
the tenth most concerned nation out of 40 markets surveyed.2 This concern is 
predominantly around misinformation on social media, where strong perceptions of ‘the 
prevalence of fake news’3 correlate to notably low levels of trust in news sourced on digital 
platforms.4 Despite steady increases in the use of social media to access news, nearly half 
who consume news this way do not trust what they see.  
From multiple surveys a broad picture emerges of who is most concerned about 
misinformation and how they perceive it. Despite lower levels of engagement with news on 
social media, older generations express the highest levels of concern.5 Despite having less 
concern about misinformation, younger generations are more likely to fact-check news 
 
 
1 Park, S. et al. 2020. Digital News Report: Australia 2020. Canberra: News and Media Research Centre. See 
https://apo.org.au/node/305057 p 77. 
2 Newman, M. et al. 2020. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020. Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of 
Journalism. See https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2020-06/DNR_2020_FINAL.pdf, p 
18 
3 Ipsos Global Advisor, 2019. Ipsos Trust in the Media. See 
https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2019-06/global-advisor-trust-in-media-report-
24jun2019.pdf 
4 Flew, T. & Dulleck, U. & Park, S. & Fisher, C. & Isler, O. 2020. ‘Trust and Mistrust in News Media’ Best Centre 
Report, Queensland University of Technology. See https://research.qut.edu.au/best/wp-
content/uploads/sites/244/2020/03/Trust-and-Mistrust-in-News-Media.pdf   p12. 
5 Park, S. et al. 2020. Digital News Report: Australia 2020. Canberra: News and Media Research Centre. p12 
https://apo.org.au/node/305057 p 78. 
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accessed online.6 This speaks more to higher levels of literacy for ‘digital native’ 
generations.  
People who already pay for their news, as well as people who have a strong interest in 
politics, are two other groups more likely to be concerned about misinformation.7 When 
asked about what kinds of misinformation concerns them most, Australians feel that 
political misinformation produced by the government, politicians or political parties is the 
highest concern.8 However, the DNR survey data suggests political orientation plays a 
considerable role in how misinformation is perceived. People who identify as left-wing, for 
example, are far more likely to be concerned about government and political 
misinformation,9 whereas people who identify as right-wing are most concerned about 
activist groups and activists spreading misinformation.10  
In the experience of many Australians online, concern does not always translate to action. 
Australians tend to take a more passive approach to misinformation and usually will not 
verify information they are accessing through social media. While some people will feel 
hesitant about sharing news they are suspicious of, this hesitancy does not mean suspicious 
information is discounted altogether, and some may still consider sharing it.11 Research 
shows that this is particularly the case among those with a lower interest in news; lower 
education levels; and among older generations.12   
When asked what should be done about misinformation, Australians lean towards several 
solutions. The Australia Institute noted there is a level of responsibility ascribed to political 
parties with ‘84% of Australians supporting truth in political advertising laws – a result which 
held across all political persuasion’.13 The 2020 Digital News Report noted 58 per cent of 
those surveyed think ‘it is up to the tech companies to “block” those responsible for the 
posts’.14 The issue of ‘fake news’ merited a different response, with one 2018 study showing 
Australians very strongly felt that misinformation around poor journalism lay with media 
companies and journalists ahead of digital platforms.15  
 
 
6 Fisher, C. et al. 2019. Digital News Report: Australia 2019. Canberra: News and Media Research Centre. See 
https://apo.org.au/node/240786, p 90. 
7 Ibid p 86. 
8 Park, S. et al. 2020. Digital News Report: Australia 2020. Canberra: News and Media Research Centre. See 
https://apo.org.au/node/305057 p 79. 
9 Ibid p 80 
10 Ibid p 80 
11 Ibid p 89 
12 Ibid pp 90-91 
13 See https://www.tai.org.au/content/truth-political-advertising-its-time-has-come. 
14 Above n 8 
15 Ibid p 38 
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These findings indicate the importance of media literacy efforts for an Australian code of 
practice. Given the challenges explored in this section in relation to dis- and misinformation, 
and the potential silencing of freedom of expression and political speech, strategic 
partnerships and initiatives in conjunction with the digital industry may be the most scalable 
solutions in such a complex area. In Section 3, we explore some of the initiatives in media 
literacy that are already being carried out by industry.  
The problem of terminology 
The problem of false information existed well before the digital era. Claire Wardle and 
Hossein Derakhshan put this into current day context in the 2017 Council of Europe Report 
(COE) Information Disorder: Towards an Interdisciplinary Framework:  
Politicians have forever made unrealistic promises during election campaigns. 
Corporations have always nudged people away from thinking about issues in particular 
ways. And the media has long disseminated misleading stories for their shock value. 
However, the complexity and scale of information pollution in our digitally connected 
world presents an unprecedented challenge.16 
Finding salient and meaningful terms to define the issues remains complex,17 and 
‘difficult’.18 First Draft, the international news verification organisation, uses the term 
‘information disorder’ to cover the types, phases, and elements of mis- and disinformation 
within the wider framework of the digital ecosystem:  
While the historical impact of rumours and fabricated content have been well 
documented, we argue that contemporary social technology means that we are 
witnessing something new: information pollution at a global scale; a complex web of 
motivations for creating, disseminating and consuming these ‘polluted’ messages; a 
myriad of content types and techniques for amplifying content; innumerable platforms 
hosting and reproducing this content; and breakneck speeds of communication 
between trusted peers.19 
To help bring order to this environment, First Draft distinguishes between disinformation, 
misinformation and malinformation.20 
 
 
16 See https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c. 
17 Claire Wardle. ‘Fake news. It’s complicated.’ See https://firstdraftnews.org/latest/fake-news-complicated/. 
18 ‘Tackling misinformation in an open society: How to respond to misinformation and disinformation when the 
cure risks being worse than the disease’. Full Fact 2018. See https://fullfact.org/blog/2018/oct/tackling-
misinformation-open-society/. 
19 See https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c  p 
4. 
20 These definitions are taken from First Draft’s Information Disorder: The Essential Glossary, July 2018. See 
https://firstdraftnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/infoDisorder_glossary.pdf?x46415 .  
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Disinformation is false information that is deliberately created or disseminated with the 
express purpose to cause harm. Producers of disinformation typically have political, 
financial, psychological, or social motivations.  
Misinformation is information that is false, but not intended to cause harm. For example, 
individuals who don’t know a piece of information is false may spread it on social media in 
an attempt to be helpful.  
Malinformation is genuine information that is shared to cause harm. This includes private or 
revealing information that is spread to harm a person or reputation.  
These definitions have been adopted by UNESCO.21  Wardle and Derakhshan’s  framework 
for managing the complex and multifaceted issues and overlaps of information disorder 
have been detailed in the Appendix of this paper. This framework outlines the types, phases 
and elements of information disorder, and takes into account the cycles of creation of 
content and re-creation and re-distribution of the content. But variations have been made, 
and efforts to combat information disorder have focussed on different elements. As noted 
above, in its 2019 policy announcement the Australian Government nominated 
‘disinformation’ along with ‘credibility signalling for news content’ as the aspects that should 
be addressed by industry in the voluntary code. Then, when releasing a position paper on the 
issue in June 2020, the ACMA used the umbrella term ‘misinformation’ to describe these 
various manifestations of information disorder.22 In considering how to approach the various 
elements that must be considered in connection with disinformation, we first look at the 
example of the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation.   
The EU Code of Practice as a reference point for a self-regulatory 
code   
The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation is the principal self-regulatory instrument that 
has been developed to tackle disinformation on digital platforms. Most of the potential 
signatories to the Australian Code are businesses that operate internationally – and some of 
them have already made commitments in keeping with the EU Code. For these reasons, it is 
an important reference point in the development of an Australian code of practice. 
The EU Code defines disinformation as follows.23 
 
 
21 See https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/journalism_fake_news_disinformation_print_friendly_0.pdf. 
22 While it references the work of First Draft, the ACMA uses ‘misinformation’ as its collective term. See 
Misinformation and news quality on digital platforms in Australia: A position paper to guide code development, 
June 2020, p11-12. 
23 See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation.  
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EU Code of Practice on Disinformation  
The Code adopts the definition used in the European 
Commission Communication ‘Tackling online disinformation: a 
European approach’. The Code defines disinformation as, 
‘“verifiably false or misleading information” which, cumulatively, 
“is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to 
intentionally deceive the public”; and 
“may cause public harm”, intended as “threats to democratic 
political and policymaking processes as well as public goods 
such as the protection of EU citizens’ health, the environment or 
security.”’24 
The Code clarifies what is not disinformation. Particularly, 
disinformation ‘does not include misleading advertising, 
reporting errors, satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan 
news and commentary, and is without prejudice to binding legal 
obligations, self-regulatory advertising codes, and standards 
regarding misleading advertising.’ 
 
While the definition of disinformation in the EU Code is a useful point of reference, several of 
the concepts it embodies require specific consideration in the Australian environment. The 
following sections discusses some of the difficulties involved in formulating definitions. 
How does disinformation fit with existing regulations? 
An important aspect of the EU Code is that it is designed to apply across the various states 
of the EU, where various national laws continue to operate. When designing a code of 
practice for a single jurisdiction such as Australia, it is important to consider the extent to 
which the EU Code is an appropriate model.  At a national level, it is easier to see how the 
subject matter covered by such a new regulatory instrument sits alongside other forms of 
regulation. Some forms of content and conduct will inevitably overlap – disinformation is 
sometimes a feature of hate speech, for example – and it will be important to consider how 
such overlaps should be handled.  
 
 
24 EU Code referencing: ‘European Commission Communication ‘Tackling Online Disinformation: A European 
Approach’ paragraph 2.1. In paragraph (b), ‘intended as’ refers to the original definition in the Communication, 
which put it this way: ‘Public harm comprises threats to democratic political and policy-making processes as 
well as …’ See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236.  
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Is intention an element of disinformation? 
Like First Draft, UK fact checking organisation Full Fact describes misinformation as the 
‘inadvertent spread of false or misleading information’ and disinformation as ‘the deliberate 
use of false or misleading information to deceive audiences’.25  
The question of whether disinformation requires an element of intention needs careful 
consideration. First Draft acknowledges complexities arise, for example in the coronavirus 
pandemic, when people share harmful yet false health information or conspiracy theories 
and genuinely believe them to be true.  Full Fact also notes it is not always helpful to ‘divide 
the issues by intent’, but rather to leave it up to the public to ‘judge where inaccuracies lie on 
the spectrum of misinformation and disinformation.’26 First Draft’s framework (see 
Appendix) further expands on the complexities of the definitions by outlining the types, 
phases and elements of information disorder where the re-production of a message may be 
different from that of the original creator of the message.  
In the EU Code intention appears only in relation to an intention to deceive, and harm is 
regarded objectively (i.e., the material or conduct may, as a matter of fact, cause harm) 
rather than subjectively (the actor intended to cause harm). A variation on this approach is 
seen in the UK Government’s Online Harms White Paper, where disinformation is described 
as ‘information which is created or disseminated with the deliberate intent to mislead; this 
could be to cause harm, or for personal, political or financial gain’. This approach applies an 
element of intention both to the act of misleading and to the causing of harm.27 The 
difficulties in establishing intention may make it more appropriate to make conduct, rather 
than content, the focus of regulatory attention.   
What kinds of harm are within scope of disinformation? 
In addition, the concept of ‘harm’ is something that will need to be considered in relation to 
local standards and community expectations, and in recognition that the level of harm 
associated with disinformation varies greatly. The EU Code relies on the concept of ‘public 
harm’ which it defines as ‘threats to democratic political and policymaking processes as well 
as public goods such as the protection of EU citizens’ health, the environment or security’.  
The need for careful consideration of the concept of harm is noted by Full Fact, which 
proposes five levels of harm ranging from ‘risk to life’, ‘economic harm’, ‘interference in 
 
 
25 ‘Tackling misinformation in an open society: How to respond to misinformation and disinformation when the 
cure risks being worse than the disease’. Full Fact 2018. See https://fullfact.org/blog/2018/oct/tackling-
misinformation-open-society/.  
26 Ibid 
27 Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport and Home Office, Online Harms White Paper (April, 2019). The 
paper distinguishes disinformation from misinformation which it describes as ‘the inadvertent sharing of false 
information’ (p 23). See https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/Online_Harms_White_Paper.pdf. 
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democracy’, ‘disengagement from democracy’ and, finally, ‘no harm’.28 This framework helps 
us to understand the variation in levels of harm, and it is also useful is showing there will be 
limits to what can be achieved through regulation: while it is easy to see a role for regulation 
in helping to prevent risk to life, for example, it is less likely that regulation will have a direct 
role in preventing disengagement from democracy.  
The impact on political expression – protecting freedom of speech  
In Australia, as in other liberal democracies, one of the most important contextual aspects 
for developing any rules or laws in relation to online content is the need to avoid imposing 
unnecessary restraints on freedom of speech and expression. While the community accepts 
that some forms of speech must be restricted – for example, child abuse material or image-
based abuse – users of digital platforms also expect a degree of freedom in their ability to 
post their own content and access that of other users and content creators. Additional 
complexities arise in assessing and classifying political expression as disinformation,29  for 
example when facts are hyperbolic or exaggerated in political expression or in media 
communications. At one end of the spectrum fact checkers may rightly challenge and 
correct figures about issues such as tax cuts;30 and in other cases, fringe politicians in 
Australia have pushed extreme right wing anti-immigration sentiment.31 But people may also 
simply disagree with opposing political statements and attempt (incorrectly) to label this as 
misinformation. It is important also to recognise that information is never ‘perfect’ and that 
factual assertions are sometimes difficult to verify. As Deborah Stone has noted, in 
democratic decision-making ‘information is interpretive, incomplete, and strategically 
withheld’ by participants, including political parties and government actors.32 These 
challenges need careful consideration in a code of practice, particularly how commitments 
made under the code may be misused with the intention of silencing political opposition. 
The EU Code addresses this through a provision that companies should not be compelled by 
governments to remove content because of perceived falsity:  
Signatories should not be compelled by governments, nor should they adopt voluntary 
policies, to delete or prevent access to otherwise lawful content or messages solely on 
the basis that they are thought to be ‘false’.  
 
 
28 Tackling misinformation in an open society: How to respond to misinformation and disinformation when the 
cure risks being worse than the disease. See. https://fullfact.org/blog/2018/oct/tackling-misinformation-open-
society/ pp 5-7. 
29 See https://about.fb.com/news/2019/10/mark-zuckerberg-stands-for-voice-and-free-expression/. 
30 See https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2019/12/12/online-political-advertising-in-the-uk-2019-general-election-
campaign/. 
31 See https://firstdraftnews.org/latest/tracking-anti-muslim-tactics-online-australias-election-misinformation/. 
32 Deborah Stone (2002), Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision-Making, WW Norton, p 28. 
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Satire and other forms of creative expression  
Consideration needs to be given to whether creative expression should be excluded from a 
definition of disinformation. In satire, for example, a falsity or exaggeration might be used 
for humour to make a broader critique or a form of political or social expression. Satire is 
often a central feature of political cartoons in countries like Australia, so that cartoons are 
generally accorded a greater leniency under media standards that relate to offence, for 
example. Satire is expressly excluded from the EU Code. However, First Draft clarifies, that if 
a person takes a satirical news story literally for example, and shares it with this mistaken 
belief, that could be considered misinformation. Additionally, if satirical memes are used as 
part of a campaign to discredit a person or racial community, this could fall under 
defamation, hate speech, cyber-bullying or disinformation.  
Example  
In February 2020, an Australian couple posted on Facebook they had ordered wine using a 
drone while they were quarantined on the Diamond Princess ship off the coast of Tokyo.33 
It was reported on by international media from Hong Kong34 to the New York Post and was 
re-shared on Facebook and Twitter including by celebrities.35 The couple later confirmed it 
was a joke for their friends, and commented that no reporter had checked with them until 
it was finally ‘fact checked’ by ABC Radio National.36  
 
How information disorder manifests  
Having considered some of the elements of disinformation and some aspects that will need 
to be taken into account for a definition of disinformation in the Australian Code, we turn 
now to look at how disinformation is propagated and the forms it takes. We consider some 
important elements, such as the role of malicious actors, and provide some specific 
examples relevant to Australia. We then look at the ‘ABC’ conceptual framework developed 
by Camille Francois, which explains the role of malicious actors, deceptive behaviour and 
harmful content. 
During coronavirus, many seemingly disparate groups have used the heightened sense of 
awareness and fear from the public to promote conspiracy theories, vaccine hesitancy and 
 
 
33 AFP Fact Check, ’Australian couple quarantined onboard Diamond Princess cruise reveal wine drone delivery 
story was ”just a prank”’ (February, 2020). AFP . See https://factcheck.afp.com/australian-couple-quarantined-
onboard-diamond-princess-cruise-reveal-wine-drone-delivery-story-was. 
34 9GAG,see https://perma.cc/RFC6-HT8D. 
35 https://twitter.com/Kate_Chastain https://perma.cc/CE8P-Z594. 
36 Paul Barry, ‘Media Tricked’ (February, 2020) ABC . See https://www.abc.net.au/mediawatch/episodes/drone/.  
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encourage people who are clearly and unequivocally against vaccinations. First Draft has 
identified a significant increase in online activity among groups sharing anti-vaccination 
content in Australia since the start of COVID-19. The motivations of agents of 
disinformation, as well as the tools and techniques used in information disorder are outlined 
below. 
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Agents of disinformation are motivated broadly by power, money, or mischief. Wardle and 
Derakhshan37 further specify the motivations as: 
• Financial: profiting from information disorder through advertising;  
• Political: discrediting a political candidate in an election and other attempts to 
influence public opinion;  
• Social: connecting with a certain group online or off (this has ramifications for 
information disorder where people are ‘recruited to an ideology’ or join conspiracy 
theory groups); and,  
• Psychological: seeking prestige or reinforcement. 
First Draft has adapted the work of Data & Society38 to identify the methods and tools used 
by agents of disinformation. These have become more sophisticated and include:39 
• Sockpuppet Accounts: the anonymous figures – bot, human, or hybrid – pretending 
to be something they are not. 
• Imposter Content: using trusted logos, branding or names as a shortcut for 
credibility. 
• Source Hacking: manipulating the news media and influential figures through lies and 
deception. 
• Keyword Squatting: associating a word with a worldview. 




40 See https://www.tga.gov.au/. 




Example: Disinformation & public figures 
In April 2020, the Therapeutic Goods Administration40 launched an investigation into 
controversial celebrity chef Pete Evans after his Facebook Live video over Easter public 
holidays touted his 15,000 USD ‘bio light’. He also used divisive language referring to the 
coronavirus as ‘Wuhan coronavirus’.  The celebrity chef’s podcasts41 alluded to 5G 
conspiracies and use of vitamins to ward off the coronavirus.   
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Example: Agents of disinformation take advantage 
The hashtag #ArsonEmergency was first used in November 2019 at the same time 
#ClimateEmergency began trending during the first round of Australia’s devastating 
summer of bushfires. #ArsonEmergency did not pick up in usage until early 2020 when 
the researchers found it was pushed in a sustained effort by around 300 inauthentic 
accounts.42 From here, it was adopted by genuine accounts as the narrative was pushed 
further into mainstream conversation. As AFP fact-check pointed out, the arson claim was 
published widely across conservative news outlets including The Australian;43 The Sun 




39 See https://firstdraftnews.org/en/education/curriculum-resources/. 
40 See https://www.tga.gov.au/. 
41 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZtWCMVk_GY. 




44 AFP Fact Check, ‘Police figures show far fewer people in Australia have been charged with bushfire arson’ 
(January, 2020) AFP. See  https://factcheck.afp.com/police-figures-show-far-fewer-people-australia-have-been-
charged-bushfire-arson.  
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 (cont.) 
Confusion over the term ‘arson’ was further exacerbated in early January after The 
Australian reported more than 180 alleged arsonists had been arrested since the start of 
2019.45 This, and many other headlines misconstrued a New South Wales Police force 
media release. As Vox quickly reported in order to debunk the story:  ‘[w]hat the release 
actually says is that legal action was taken against 183 people since November 8, 2019, 
for fire-related offenses, including things like improperly discarding cigarettes or not 
taking enough precautions around machinery, i.e. not arson.’46 The false claim was picked 
up and amplified on the international stage by Donald Trump Jr., Fox News, famous alt 
right figures and websites. A Google search for ‘Australia and bushfires in that same week 
returned headlines focused on the ‘arson crisis’ topic and pitched this to question climate 
change. However, as debunks filled the ‘data voids’, more reliable stories quickly showed 
up higher in the search results.  
The term ‘data voids’, created by danah boyd and Michael Golebiewski, provides a useful 
concept for journalists reporting on disinformation.47 Examples from the case studies 
point to the importance of journalists and platforms working together to address public 
questions and fill the voids with reliable information. For example, when Google searches 
show a spike for a particular term that has not surfaced before, or returns few meaningful 
results, this ‘data void’ provides an opportunity for content from bad actors to surface. So 
while a search of ‘bushfire Australia’ initially turned up ‘Arson emergency’ related stories, 
as ranking adjusted to more available quality information and as journalists corrected and 
replaced the topic with debunks, the search returned fact checked information first. 
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The role of malicious actors  
Malicious actors act to inflict harm on a person, organisation or country. As methods can 
include leaks, harassment and hate speech, there is a clear overlap with other forms of 
regulated speech. This conceptual distinction is useful as it helps to show how aspects of 
information disorder may already be the subject of existing regulation, including, in some 
cases, criminal law. This is particularly the case in relation to malicious actors and the 
spread of malinformation. 
In explaining malinformation, Claire Wardle noted, ‘It is important to distinguish messages 
that are true from those that are false, but also those that are true (and those messages with 
some truth) but which are created, produced or distributed by ‘agents’ who intend to harm 
rather than serve the public interest.’48 For example, The Mueller Report established the 
social media campaign by Russian actors included a hacking operation against the Clinton 
Campaign which released stolen documents.49  
Australia has not seen high profile public examples of malinformation when compared to 
examples arising out of the US; however, the subject of foreign interference in elections and 
in democratic formations more generally has been the subject of political inquiry.50 The risk 
of this occurring in future in Australia could overlap with national security concerns with 
campaigns by foreign agents, however little details are available publicly on this issue. In 
February 2019, three months ahead of the federal election, Canberra confirmed government 
computers had been hacked, and described the level of sophistication as  
‘unprecedented’.51 52 The government did not disclose which country they believed was 





46 Umair Irfan, ‘The viral false claim that nearly 200 arsonists are behind the Australia fires, explained’ (January, 
2020) Vox. See https://www.vox.com/2020/1/9/21058332/australia-fires-arson-lightning-explained.  
47 See https://datasociety.net/library/data-voids/. 
48 Clare Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, ‘Journalism, “Fake News” & Disinformation’ (2018) UNESCO 
<https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/f._jfnd_handbook_module_2.pdf> p 44. 
49 Robert S Mueller III, ‘Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election' 
(March, 2019) Volume I. See https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf p 4. 
50 For example, in 2018 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) completed a 
Review of the National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2017. The 
PJCIS has also been asked by the Minister for Home Affairs to conduct an inquiry into foreign interference in 
Australia’s universities, publicly funded research agencies and competitive research grants agencies. See 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/About_the_House_News/Media_Releas
es/Foreign_interference_in_universities_inquiry_under_consideration. In addition, the Senate Select Committee 
on Foreign Interference through Social Media is to report by May 2022. See 
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Foreign_Interference_through_Social_M
edia/ForeignInterference.  
51 David Wroe and Chris Uhlmann, ‘Australia’s major political parties hacked in “sophisticated” attack ahead of 
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Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) found in March that China's Ministry of State Security 
was responsible for the hack on MPs' emails.53 This included the networks of the Australian 
Labor Party, the Liberals and the Nationals.54 While this behaviour may be regarded as 
espionage or some other form of offence against national security, hacked emails that are 
leaked and framed negatively can also be regarded as a form of malinformation. 
A disinformation ‘ABC’  
Camille Francois from Graphika and the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at 
Harvard University has distilled definitions of disinformation into what is known widely in the 
research community as an ‘ABC’ framework focused on actors, behaviour and content.55  
Francois noted that ‘manipulative actors’ (with the clear intention to disrupt the information 
ecosystem), ’deceptive behaviors’ (tactics and techniques used by the actors) and ‘harmful 
content’ (used to hurt, undermine or influence) are ‘three key vectors characteristic of viral 
deception’.56   
‘A’: manipulative actors 
Manipulative actors ‘engage knowingly and with clear intent in viral deception campaigns.’57 
The actors’ intent and their campaigns are ‘covert, designed to obfuscate the identity and 
intent of the actor orchestrating them’.58  Russian disinformation campaigns that targeted 
the US 2016 presidential election provide an example of covert actors with the intent to 
deceive. The Mueller Report established the intent of the social media campaign by Russian 
actors ‘favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential 
candidate Hillary Clinton.’59 Investigations for the Mueller Report showed that the Internet 
Research Agency (IRA), based in St Petersburg, Russia, ‘carried out the earliest Russian 
interference operations’, and ‘received funding from Russian oligarch Yevgeniy Prigozhin’ 
 
 
53 Colin Packham, ‘Exclusive: Australia concluded China was behind hack on parliament, political parties – 
sources' (September, 2019) Reuters. See https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-china-cyber-
exclusive/exclusive-australia-concluded-china-was-behind-hack-on-parliament-political-parties-sources-
idUSKBN1W00VF.  
54 Rob Harris, ‘Intelligence agencies pinned Parliament hack on Beijing: report’ (September, 2019) Sydney Morning 
Herald. See https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/intelligence-agencies-pinned-parliament-hack-on-beijing-
report-20190916-p52rou.html.  
55 Actors, Behaviors, Content: A Disinformation ABC. Highlighting Three Vectors of Viral Deception to Guide 
Industry and Responses. A working paper of the Transatlantic High Level Working Group on Content Moderation 
Online and Freedom of expression. Graphika and Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard 
University p 2. 
56 Camille Francois, 'Actors, Behaviours, Content: A disinformation ABC'; See also: Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 
Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and trolls Helped Elect a President What We Don’t, Can’t, and Do Know. (Oxford 
University Press, 2018). 
57 Ibid p 2. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Robert S Mueller III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election 
(March, 2019) Volume I. See https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf p 1. 
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who ‘is widely reported to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin.’60 The campaign 
involved a social media campaign designed to ‘provoke and amplify political and social 
discord in the United States’ and a hacking operation against the Clinton Campaign which 
released stolen documents.61  
For an example of manipulative actors in the Asia region, harassment and hate speech 
erupted on social media platforms commenting on the 2019 Hong Kong summer protests. 
This fuelled  polarisation and limited constructive dialogue.  On August 20, 2019, Twitter 
identified ‘that Chinese State-controlled media leveraged Twitter advertising to promote 
content critical of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong.’62  
Cybersecurity concerns in Australia is a potential overlapping area which risks exposure to 
disinformation campaigns led by manipulative actors. The Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute identified foreign interference in 20 countries including Australia.63 On June 19, 
2020, the Prime Minister Scott Morrison delivered a public address where he announced 
‘Australian organisations are currently being targeted by a sophisticated state-based cyber-
actor.’64  The risks were earlier acknowledged when, on December 5, 2019, the Senate 
established the Select Committee on Foreign Interference through Social Media to inquire 
into and report on the risk posed to Australia’s democracy by foreign interference through 
social media. 
Detection of state-based manipulative actors has traditionally been the domain of cyber-
security government departments. Francois noted, however, that ‘disinformation actors 
exploit the whole information ecosystem’65 and called for a more integrated response to 
reach across all products and services offered by platforms. Given that this exploitation will 
include various tools, techniques and content, it is likely this may overlap with mis- and 
disinformation. 
This means that security measures that various platforms have adopted serve to ensure the 
integrity of their services and authenticity of their users’ accounts to prevent manipulative 
actors are therefore relevant actions to address disinformation, and should be considered 
under an Australian code of practice. Current platform interventions in relation to preventing 
fake accounts, and measures aimed at preventing impersonation, are explored in Section 2. 
 
 
60 Ibid p 4. 
61 Ibid. 
62  Above n 56. 
63 Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Brief, Report No. 16/2019 ‘Hacking democracies: cataloguing cyber-
enabled attacks on elections’. See https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2019-
05/Hacking%20democracies_0.pdf?.RKLLc8uKm1wobfWH1VvC.C88xGWYY29>. 
64 Daniel Hurst, ‘Cyber-Attack Australia: sophisticated attacks from ’state-based actor’, PM says‘ (June, 2020) The 
Guardian. See https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jun/19/australia-cyber-attack-attacks-hack-
state-based-actor-says-australian-prime-minister-scott-morrison. 
65  Above n 56  p 2. 
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‘B’: deceptive behaviour 
The next ‘vector of disinformation’ in Francois’ ‘ABC’ framework is known as ‘Deceptive 
Behavior’ which is focused on the techniques used by deceptive actors.66 The goal of these 
techniques is to give the impression of a greater impact as if there were larger numbers of 
actors. These techniques range from ‘automated tools (e.g., bot armies used to amplify the 
reach and effect of a message) to manual trickery (e.g., paid engagement, troll farms).’67 
Francois noted, ‘while there are significant differences in the various disinformation 
definitions and terms of service applicable to the issue among technology companies, the 
focus on deceptive behavior appears to be a clear convergence point throughout the 
technology industry.’68  For example, Google’s February 2019 White Paper, How Google 
Fights Disinformation, noted: 
... the words ‘misinformation’, ‘disinformation’, and ‘fake news’ mean different things to 
different people and can become politically charged when they are used to 
characterize the propagators of a specific ideology or to undermine political 
adversaries.  
However, there is something objectively problematic and harmful to our users when 
malicious actors attempt to deceive them. It is one thing to be wrong about an issue. It 
is another to purposefully disseminate information one knows to be inaccurate with 
the hope that others believe it is true or to create discord in society.69  
We refer to these deliberate efforts to deceive and mislead using the speed, scale, and 
technologies of the open web as ‘disinformation’.  
The entities that engage in disinformation have a diverse set of goals. Some are financially 
motivated, engaging in disinformation activities for the purpose of turning a profit. Others 
are politically motivated, engaging in disinformation to foster specific viewpoints among a 
population, to exert influence over political processes, or for the sole purpose of polarizing 
and fracturing societies. Others engage in disinformation for their own entertainment, which 
often involves bullying, and they are commonly referred to as ‘trolls’.70   
Francois noted Facebook mostly defines deceptive behaviour through its ‘Coordinated 




66 Ibid p 4. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Google, ‘How Google Fights Disinformation’ (February, 2019). See 
https://kstatic.googleusercontent.com/files/388aa7d18189665e5f5579aef18e181c2d4283fb7b0d4691689dfd
1bf92f7ac2ea6816e09c02eb98d5501b8e5705ead65af653cdf94071c47361821e362da55b  2. 
70 Ibid p 2. 
71 Above n 56 p 4. 
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Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior is when groups of pages or people work together to 
mislead others about who they are or what they’re doing. Coordinated Inauthentic 
Behavior isn’t unique to Facebook, or social media.  People have been working 
together to mislead others for centuries, and they continue to do so.  
When we take down one of these networks, it’s because of their deceptive behavior, 
it’s not because of the content they’re sharing. The posts themselves may not be false 
and may not go against our community standards. We might take a network down for 
making it look like it’s been run from one part of the world, when in fact it’s been run 
from another.   
This could be done for ideological purposes, or it could be financially motivated, for 
example spammers might seek to convince people to click on a link to visit their page 
or to read their posts.72 
Francois noted the ‘detection and mitigation techniques’ in deceptive behaviour can be 
‘similar to spam detection’.73 As outlined above, platforms have proactive measures to 
identify problematic accounts and behaviours. Google utilises algorithmic signals to indicate 
deceptive behaviour. Where there is an indication that a publisher may be violating their 
policies, such as through a user report or suspicious account activity, Google’s Trust and 
Safety team investigates and then, where appropriate, acts against that site and any related 
sites that can be confirmed to be operating in concert. Facebook utilises machine learning 
and AI in 'proactive' detection and take-down of Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour - 
networks of accounts or pages working to mislead others about who they are, and what they 
are doing.  Machine based learning is utilised by Twitter to identify and track accounts 
engaged in manipulative behaviour in order to identify inauthentic behaviour and neutralise 
this before users are exposed to misleading, inauthentic, or distracting content. LinkedIn 
utilises automated, machine learning to identify characteristics of bad actors and fake 
profiles.  
Francois also noted that enforcement actions available to platforms such as content 
demotion and account suspension are ‘rarely spelled out for users or made clear for users 
affected’ and when it comes to manipulative actors and deceptive behaviour vectors, 
‘platforms have much more visibility into those issues than external researchers and 
stakeholders.’74 However, platforms have noted the risk of their systems being gamed and 
exploited drawing upon any information that is made public about such actions, which can 




72 Nathaniel Gleicher, ’Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior explained‘  (December , 2018) Facebook Newsroom. See 
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/12/inside-feed-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior/.  
73 Above n 55 pp 4-5. 
74 Ibid p 5. 
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‘C’: harmful content 
Francois noted content can lead to posts and messages being classified as viral deception, 
and is the most ‘visible vector of the three: while it is difficult for an observer to attribute 
messages to a manipulative actor or to observe behavior patterns across a campaign, every 
user can see and form an opinion on the content of social media posts.’75 Moderation of 
such content can intersect and overlap with other regulatory and legal frameworks e.g., 
‘harmful content’, which Francois noted is the subject of ongoing debates about definitions 
including ‘violent extremism’, ‘hate speech,’ ‘terrorist content’.76  Francois noted ‘entire 
categories of content can be deemed “harmful” because they belong to the realm of viral 
deception, eg, health misinformation’.77 Additional ways Francois noted the intersection of 
harmful content and disinformation campaigns can manifest include: 
• The content of a campaign itself can be manipulated to deceive users and therefore 
belong to the realm of ‘disinformation’, and, 
• ‘Harmful content’ can be promoted by deceptive actors or by campaigns leveraging 
distortive behaviors.78   
All platforms have policies in place to address the content, and the industry measures to 
address these issues are outlined in Section 3. 
News credibility  
In the final part of this section, we consider the role of traditional media. This is necessary in 
order to understand how disinformation might spread, but also how it might be addressed. 
In addition, as noted above, ‘credibility signalling for news content’ is an aspect that the 
Federal Government would like to see addressed in an Australian Code. 
The 2018 report, The Oxygen of Amplification, noted, ‘it is problematic enough when everyday 
citizens help spread false, malicious, or manipulative information across social media. It is 
infinitely more problematic when journalists, whose work can reach millions, do the same.’79 
This suggests that professional journalists and news organisations have a responsibility to 
be aware of the role they play in spreading and amplifying falsehoods.80   First Draft uses the 
‘tipping point’ to help journalists assess amplification risks where newsrooms must balance 
 
 
75 Above n 55 p 6. 
76 Ibid p 6. 
77 Ibid p 6. 
78 Above n 55  p 6. 
79 Whitney Phillips, Syracuse University, 2018 Data & Society report: The Oxygen of Amplification: Better Practices 
for Reporting on Extremists,  Antagonists and Manipulators. See https://datasociety.net/library/oxygen-of-
amplification/. 
80 First Draft Training: ‘What does responsible reporting mean in an age of information disorder?’. See 
https://firstdraftnews.org/training/responsible-reporting/. 
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the public interest in the story against the possible consequences of overage. 
Misinformation or poor reporting by media also provides an opportunity for agents of 
disinformation to take advantage of the situation – see the example below, ‘Agents of 
disinformation take advantage’ with the case of the hashtag #ArsonEmergency in Australia. 
Media manipulation – where the goal of agents of disinformation is to have their issue 
reported on - is another consideration that journalists must be on guard for.  Alice Marwick 
and Rebecca Lewis noted in their 2017 report, Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online, 
that, for manipulators, ‘it doesn’t matter if the media is reporting on a story in order to 
debunk or dismiss it; the important thing is getting it covered in the first place.’81 
Fact checking  
Accuracy is considered a core value shared by professional journalists, with the process of 
verifying facts a deliberate, conscious step for journalists, rather than it being an incidental 
by-product from gathering facts.82 However it has been argued that ‘many journalism 
textbooks are devoid of references to verification or fact-checking… or make only the 
briefest references to the importance of double-checking basic facts.’83 
The digital era led to a global increase in the number of in-house fact checking units at 
media organisations in the US such as FactCheck.org which launched in 2003, and PolitiFact 
and the Washington Post’s Fact Checker, which debuted in 2007. These  fact checking units 
can have different foci – from checking ‘the accuracy of the substantive claims made by 
politicians’ rather than journalists simply trying to copy the quote from the politicians 
correctly84 – to replicating the work of a media organization’s legal department.  Most 
prominently in Australia, ABC Fact Check was launched in 2013 to ‘test and adjudicate on 
the accuracy of claims made by politicians, public figures, advocacy groups and institutions 
engaged in public debate’,85 and was re-launched as ‘ABC RMIT FactCheck’ in 2017. 
PolitiFact expanded to Australia in 201386 also with a focus on political fact checking.   
However, media organisations in Australia (and globally) were left exposed to inaccuracies 
arising from UGC included or used as content in professional media reports.  The BBC first 
adapted social media into its journalistic production practices in something of a ‘trial and 
 
 
81 Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis, 2017 Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online. Data & Society 
Research Institute. See https://datasociety.net/library/media-manipulation-and-disinfo-online. 
82 Kruger, A. L. (2019). Ahead of the e-curve: Leading global social media verification education from Asia in a 
21st century mediascape. (Thesis). University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong SAR. See 
http://hub.hku.hk/handle/10722/278427. 
83 Shapiro, I. Brin., Bedard-Brule, I., & Mychajlowycz,K. (2013). ‘Verification as a Strategic Ritual’. Journalism 
Practice, Journalism Practice, 7 (6), 657-673, p 658. 
84 Stassen, 2010, ‘Your News in 140 characters: Exploring the role of social media in journalism’. Global Media 
Journal, African Edition, 4 (1) p 118. 
85 See https://www.rmit.edu.au/news/all-news/2017/feb/rmit-and-abc-news-relaunch-fact-check. 
86 See https://www.politifact.com/article/2013/may/12/politifact-expands-australia/. 
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error’ manner – potentially harming the reputation the BBC had with its audience.87 In 
Australia, there are numerous cases where the media have not checked the provenance of 
online content and identities before publication.88 This highlights the importance for 
journalists to understand the production, dissemination and interaction of messages and 
information in social media, so that news organisations can deliver reliable information for 
society. This required new skills to track and monitor social media.  
In 2017 First Draft and Full Fact noted: 
fact-checking and verification have occupied quite different spaces within journalism, 
and the skills have been seen as distinct and specialist. Only with the rise of fabricated 
news websites did fact-checking and verification organizations find themselves both 
being asked how to ‘debunk’ these sites.89  
The necessity of these skills, and knowledge of the tools and techniques to combat 
information disorder have since grown. While advanced verification training by organisations 
such as First Draft has focused on journalists, it has become increasingly evident that as 
celebrities and others who have a powerful platform have amplified and spread falsehoods, 
they too could well benefit society if they had some form of training in the principles of 
verification.  
In March 2017, the then director of the International Fact Checking Network, Alexios 
Mantzarlis posted a tweet with the Venn diagram below, in an attempt to explain the 





87 Belair-Gagnon, 2012,  ‘Getting it Right! : How did social media transform BBC News journalism’ Communiquer 
dans un monde de norms  p 237. 
88 Kaur, Kanchan and Nair, Shyam and Kwok, Yenni and Kajimoto, Masato and Chua, Yvonne T. and Labiste, Ma. 
Diosa and Soon, Carol and Jo, Hailey and Lin, Lihyun and Le, Trieu Thanh and Kruger, Anne.  Information 
Disorder in Asia and the Pacific: Overview of Misinformation Ecosystem in Australia, India, Indonesia, Japan, the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam (October 10, 2018). See 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3134581 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3134581. 
89 Claire Wardle, First Draft and Will Moy, Full Fact ‘Is that actually true? Combining fact-checking and verification 
for #GE17. See  https://firstdraftnews.org/latest/fullfact-ge17/. 
90 Ibid. 





The role of traditional media 
Misleading content frames information, an issue or an individual in a misleading manner. 
There are many instances of how this can occur. The following example shows how the role 
of news outlets can further amplify misinformation into online spaces, and lead to harmful 
assumptions which can open the way for agents of disinformation to use this to push their 
own agenda. Regulation that encourages verification training and media literacy awareness 
for the public would help to address the situation. Ongoing longitudinal research into the 
efficacy of the measures is also currently limited and would help to inform the design of 
such training. 
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Example: Traditional media amplification  
In mid-February, major news organisations around the world published stories about a 
‘terrifying’ map, with red lines crisscrossing and encircling the globe, lines they falsely 
claimed were how COVID-19 would spread, or how it had spread already.91 Their source, 
they all reported, was a study from the WorldPop Project at the University of Southampton 
in the UK. The study, which was not peer-reviewed, estimated how many people had left 
Wuhan before the region was locked down. The image WorldPop initially tweeted to 
accompany the study however, showed global air-traffic routes and travel for the entirety 
of 2011. The tweet was hastily deleted with little explanation as to why, and the study 
reshared without the old image. But it had already been misinterpreted and republished by 
tabloids and television producers around the world including in Australia, apparently 
without any semblance of fact checking. The project responded to First Draft queries and 
described the image as ‘intended to be an illustrative picture of the global air network’.92 
Such an image was easily misunderstood and required critical thinking. The image used in 
WorldPop’s first tweet remains93 (current as of July 13) on the official Channel 7 Sunrise 
@sunriseon7 twitter feed, and the video has been viewed 211, 600 times. This fuelled 
division and fear in a time of crisis. 
 
Screenshot by Anne Kruger 
While verification training has been aimed at journalists, recent examples show this should 
also be extended to public figures such as celebrities, politicians and sporting heroes; they 
too have a responsibility to be aware of the role they play in spreading and amplifying 
falsehoods due to their elevated reach.  




Example: Misinformation & public figures 
At the height of Australia’s extreme bushfire season, celebrity Rihanna tweeted a 
misleading picture of the country to her 96 million followers which enabled mass 
amplification. The 3D art was made using hotspot data from 31 days of fires according to 
the artist who created it, but it was mistaken for a NASA photograph. While the creator 
issued a public clarification on Instagram, this highlights questions of responsibility by 
original creators and re-sharers of online content. It also highlights as the possibilities for 
technological developments to aid audience understanding about the original source or 







91 Carlotta Dotto and Jack Berkefeld, ‘From coronavirus to bushfires, misleading maps are distorting reality’ 
(February, 2020) First Draft News. See https://firstdraftnews.org/latest/from-coronavirus-to-bushfires-
misleading-maps-are-distorting-reality/. 
92 Ibid. 
93 See https://perma.cc/LS76-J45L Archive taken July 13,2020 of post from @sunriseon7 Twitter account. 
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2 Industry initiatives 
Our research and consultations with industry have highlighted extensive efforts by platforms 
and providers of online content to encourage authenticity and transparency in online 
communication in relation to mis- and disinformation.  
The common belief is that the challenge to address disinformation requires a holistic 
approach, with a recognition of responsibility and a range of measures and with varied 
responsibilities across the digital ecosystem. At the same time, providers have expressed a 
strong desire to not become ‘the arbiters of truth’, highlighting the complexities of this role in 
line with user expectations, and have arrived at technical and policy measures which both 
address the problems while also preserving the principles of freedom of expression.94  
Additionally, platforms and online services continue to invest considerable resources in 
consumer programs to improve digital media literacy and fact-checking,95 as well as efforts 
that inform research and counter emerging threats,96 and journalism to support the news 
ecosystem.97  
Industry consultations underline the scale of a task for operators in the digital space, and 
also the benefits of a unified approach in tackling mis- and disinformation. The unfolding 
global health crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, intensified the process of 
addressing disinformation and misinformation, and encouraged collaborative efforts by 
industry, researchers, government and public health agencies in seeking holistic measures 
to improve the quality and dissemination of COVID-19 information to online consumers.98 
Our consultations indicate platforms and providers recognise this period as an opportunity 
to progress their combined efforts in countering disinformation.  
The diversity of digital products 
The information ecosystem is comprised of a wide range of public digital resources 
demanding an equally diverse approach to resolving the impact of mis- and disinformation. 
 
 
94 See https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech/.  
95 See https://world-wide-what.tumblr.com/post/190101116282/the-internet-can-be-a-really-wonderful-place-its; 
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/06/coronavirus/, and  
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/.  
96 See https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/twitter-data-shows-china-using-fake-accounts-to-spread-propaganda/. 




joint-effort-misinformation-fraud, and WHO ‘Stop The Spread’ https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-
stories/detail/countering-misinformation-about-covid-19’.  
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In this complex network of search engines, software providers and user generated content 
platforms, each provider has its own unique set of functions, followers, and technical 
considerations to which no single technological fix, labelling system or filter can apply.99 
This ecosystem includes the products explained below. 
Search engines consist of software systems designed to search for information on the World 
Wide Web. They operate in an automated fashion using sophisticated algorithms to collect 
information, in a process known as ‘crawling’. Web crawlers, commonly referred to as search 
engine bots or spiders, generally return results in a curated, ranked set of links to content 
websites.100 Examples include Google Search, Baidu and Bing. This excludes downstream 
partners that host search functions on their own platforms that are powered by third-party 
search engines, as they have no legal or operational control of search results nor the order in 
which they are produced.   
Software as a service (SaaS) allows users to licence software, often on a subscription basis, 
which is centrally hosted by a company.  The infrastructure and data are hosted in the 
service provider’s data centre, usually using cloud-based computing. End users control their 
usage of the software, and service providers have limited control over its usage once 
licensed. SaaS has become a common model for many applications, including office 
software, some messaging software, enterprise and creative tools. Some examples include 
Adobe’s creative, marketing and business software, and Microsoft Office. 
User-generated content platforms are online services that host high volumes of content 
uploaded by end users and enable them to connect with each other. User-generated content 
is often accessible in distinct links, and collections of content can be displayed in ‘feeds’ and 
curated by algorithms or displayed chronologically. User-generated content platforms can 
include blogs and microblogs, social media, social networks, discussion boards and photo, 
text and video sharing sites and some marketplaces. Examples include Facebook, Twitter, 
YouTube, LinkedIn and Change.org.  
Messaging services and email permit sharing within ‘closed’ messaging groups or between 
individuals. These services may be products offered within or associated with user-
generated content platforms (e.g. Facebook Messenger), or may also be offered with SaaS 
offerings (e.g. Slack, Outlook) or associated with particular hardware (e.g. Apple iMessage).   
Digital content aggregation platforms are intermediaries that collect information from 
various sources and deliver content to consumers in a curated and branded news or 
information product.  Users are generally able to filter and utilise custom tools to tailor the 
aggregated results to personal interests. Examples also include Google News, Apple News, 
 
 
99 See https://medium.com/1st-draft/fake-news-its-complicated-d0f773766c79.  
100 See https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/ACCC%20Digital%20Platforms%20Inquiry%20-
%20Preliminary%20Report.pdf  p 23. 
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and Flipboard. Aggregation technology is also central to some e-commerce and marketplace 
platforms (such as Redbubble). Whereas, other services which started as aggregators 
(Yahoo) have shifted to feature greater emphasis on original news content. These platforms 
either include third-party content, original content produced by the platform, or a 
combination of the two. 
Industry initiatives: five themes 
The following table outlines an industry framework of five common themes identified in the 
various efforts to counter mis- and disinformation. There is a spectrum of initiatives aimed 
at both mitigating and addressing mis and disinformation content and behaviour, 
empowering users of services with information, elevating quality content, and promoting 
digital media literacy.  
Policies to respond to mis- and disinformation content  
These are active measures to identify and address disinformation and harmful 
misinformation presently in place in content and platform policies, such as restrictions, 
community guidelines or terms and conditions that industry apply to users across their 
services and enforce through a range of proactive and reactive reporting mechanisms that 
include technical measures and human review. These generally focus on content restrictions 
for user-generated and advertiser content.   
Measures to address inauthentic behaviour 
These include efforts to address inauthentic behaviour, which is a key signal for 
disinformation in particular. This includes action on fake accounts, automated bots or other 
manipulative behaviour that are inauthentic or designed to deceive other users of the 
platforms.  
Credibility signalling & contextual information 
This encapsulates measures which are intended to assist users identify the reliability, 
trustworthiness and source of news content featured on a service. Our interviews with 
industry also indicated that these efforts often extend beyond news, in areas such as image 
authenticity. These initiatives can take the form of content ‘badging’, ‘trust ticks’, ‘fact-check 
labels’ or other forms of expandable information buttons that reveal the extent to which 
material has been verified, and collated with accountability, ethics, and the highest 
standards of practice. The surrounding information is intended to empower users with 
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sufficient context to judge for themselves the accountability frameworks of a particular 
source.101   
Measures to promote quality content  
These are solutions which utilise a range of machine learning, algorithmic, human editorial, 
and curation processes to promote genuine and trusted content and information from 
trusted government or news sources, or high quality information that has been fact-checked, 
in order to improve the quality of content exposed to consumers.  
Media literacy efforts to educate about mis- and disinformation 
The recurring theme of digital media literacy recognises a healthy information ecosystem 
depends upon informed consumers of digital services, and increased media literacy is 
critical to empowering consumers in combatting information disorder.102 Initiatives in this 
category also acknowledge the essential role which independent research has in identifying 
emerging issues and contributing to solutions that improve information outcomes for both 
industry and consumers.103  
 
 
101 Report from London School of Economics, Commission on Truth, Trust and Technology, 2019. See 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/media-and-communications/assets/documents/research/T3-Report-Tackling-the-
Information-Crisis.pdf. 
102 Key Findings, ACCC Digital Platforms Inquiry Final Report June 2019, p.359; C Wardle & H Derakhshan, 
Information Disorder: Toward an interdisciplinary framework for research and policymaking, Council of Europe, 
2017.  
103 European Commission, ‘Code of Practice on Disinformation One Year On: Online platforms submit self 
assessment reports’, 2019. 
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TABLE 1: ‘Five themes’ – a current snapshot of industry initiatives, sampled from evolving policies and efforts across all platforms.104 
 
 Policies to address to mis- and 
disinformation content 
Measures to address inauthentic 
behaviour 
Credibility signalling  Measures to promote quality 
content 
Education and media literacy efforts 
Microsoft Microsoft’s Code of Conduct 
covers the bulk of Microsoft’s 
consumer products, websites, and 
services105 and restricts 
fraudulent, false, or misleading 
behaviour and harmful activities. 
Microsoft Advertising features106 
also have disallowed product and 
services policies. 
LinkedIn’s Professional 
Community Policies include 
measures to address harassing, 
hateful, violent and exploitative 
content, which it considers 
relevant in addressing some 
harmful misinformation and 
disinformation content. Violations 
are detected through mix of 
automated defences and user 
reports.107  
Search engine Bing has 
guidelines108 that restrict 
inappropriate, manipulative, or 
misleading behaviour. 
Microsoft successfully tested a new AI 
Framework in early fake news detection, 
called Multiple Sources of Weak Social 
Supervision (MWSS) reduces this 
timeframe. The new framework has 
tested successfully with user 
engagement on news articles. MWSS 
leverages weak social supervision 
signals from multiple sources, reducing 
aggregation times and making the 
approach more suitable for early 
detection.109 
LinkedIn has focussed on using 
automated, machine learned models to 
identify characteristics of bad 
actors/fake profiles.110 LinkedIn utilises 
AI and machine learning in ‘fake’ 
account detection. 93% of blocked 
accounts for June-Dec 2019 were 
detected through automated 
measures.111 
 
Microsoft uses the NewsGuard 
plugin tool for its Edge browser 
and Bing search engine. This 
tool generates trust certificates 
rating websites on nine 
journalistic standards criteria. 
Ratings are colour-coded and 
include green (pass), red (fail), 
yellow (satire). 
LinkedIn has an editorial team of 
journalists globally including in 
Australia who work to create and 
curate information and promote it in 
various editorial products promoted 
to their members.  
 
Microsoft has digital media literacy 
programs that utilise the tool 
NewsGuard. Public Libraries and 
schools across all markets are provided 
free access to the NewsGuard browser 
plug-in for use in their digital media 
literacy education programs. 
Microsoft also has a Defending 
Democracy program which increases 
political advertising transparency online, 
explores technological solutions to 
preserve and protect electoral 




104 Table 1 is provided as an indication of some industry initiates. 
105 See https://www.microsoft.com/en-ph/servicesagreement/#serviceslist.  
106 See https://about.ads.microsoft.com/en-au/resources/policies/disallowed-content-policies.  
107 See https://www.linkedin.com/help/linkedin/answer/34593/linkedin-professional-community-policies?src=li-other&veh=blog.linkedin.com%7Cli-other.  
108 ‘Abuse and Examples of Things to Avoid’, Bing Webmaster Guidelines. See https://www.bing.com/webmaster/help/webmaster-guidelines-30fba23a.  
109 Shu et al, 2020 ‘Leveraging Multi-Source Weak Social Supervision for Early Detection of Fake News’, April 2020. See  https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.01732.pdf.  
110 See https://engineering.linkedin.com/blog/2018/09/automated-fake-account-detection-at-linkedin. 
111 See https://about.linkedin.com/transparency/community-report#fake-accounts.  
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Twitter In relation to coronavirus, Twitter 
broadened its definition of harm to 
address content that goes directly 
against guidance from 
authoritative sources of global and 
local public health information. It 
has also broadened its guidance 
on unverified claims related to 
COVID-19 that have the potential 
to incite people to action, could 
lead to the destruction or damage 
of critical infrastructure, or cause 
widespread panic or social unrest 
may be considered a violation of 
our policies 
Twitter has restrictions on 
synthetic or manipulated media 
that are likely to cause harm, 
including credibility signalling and 
transparency efforts in these 
areas. It also has relevant 
measures in areas user safety, 
privacy and authenticity, such as 
policies that apply to users who 
seek to manipulate trending topics 
lists and content that is 
considered likely to lead to 
imminent danger, harm, or 
violence.112 
It also has a range of relevant 
advertising policies, including the 
global prohibition of the promotion 
of political content and restrictions 
on state media purchase of 
advertising. 
 
Twitter Community Rules contain a 
range of restrictions, including on 
‘platform manipulation’, including to 
‘artificially amplify or suppress 
information’ or ‘engage in behaviour that 
manipulates or disrupts people’s 
experience on Twitter’. It restricts 
impersonation, highlighting behaviour 
that may ‘mislead, confuse, or deceive 
others’.  
Twitter uses machine learning, along 
with policies and human review, to 
determine how Tweets are presented in 
communal places like conversations and 
search. They detect for behaviours that 
distort and detract from the public 
conversation and use this to determine 
how Tweets are organised. This results 
in lower quality, unhealthy content 
becoming less visible and healthier, 
higher quality content more visible.113  
 
Twitter introduced new labels 
and warning messages that will 
provide additional context and 
information on some Tweets 
containing disputed or 
misleading information related 
to COVID-19. These labels linked 
to a Twitter-curated page or 
external trusted source 
containing additional 
information on the claims made 
within the Tweet. The labels 
cover the content, requiring an 
extra click to view the original 
post. 
 
Twitter collaborated with the 
Australian Department of Health, 
and other governments 
internationally, to develop a 
proactive prompt which directs 
users to authoritative information 
from the Government and WHO 
when people are searching for 
#COVID19 and related terms.  
 
Twitter recently announced a global 
media literacy program with UNESCO.  
This partnership built on existing efforts 
where the two organisations have 
previously launched a media literacy 
focused handbook. Efforts in this area 
are focused on the verification of 
sources, critical thinking, active 
citizenship online, and the breaking 
down of digital divides.   
 
Twitter has other partnerships around 
journalism training and media literacy 
initiatives, include Reporters Without 
Borders, and the Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press. These are 
aimed at ensuring Twitter’s real-time 
capacity to neutralise misinformation is 
built into the newsroom approach of 
established media outlets. 
Twitter also maintains a public archive 






112 Twitter announcement on a ‘broadened definition of harm’ to address content contrary to guidance from authoritative sources of global and local public health information. See 
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/covid-19.html#misleadinginformation 
113 See https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/product/2018/Serving_Healthy_Conversation.html. 
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Facebook Facebook has a range of relevant 
community and advertising 
standards. These include 
restrictions on ‘Misinformation 
and unverifiable rumours that 
contribute to the risk of imminent 
violence or physical harm...’; 
‘…Pages and domains that 
propagate misinformation’; 
Manipulated media that ‘would 
likely mislead an average person 
to believe that a subject of the 
video said words that they did not 
say’. 
Its advertising policies restrict 
misinformation such that it 
‘prohibits ads that include claims 
debunked by third-party fact 
checkers or, in certain 
circumstances, claims debunked 
by organizations with particular 
expertise. Advertisers that 
repeatedly post information 
deemed to be false may have 
restrictions placed on their ability 
to advertise on Facebook.’ 
Facebook’s relevant policies in 
relation to coronavirus included 
limiting misinformation and 
harmful content, prohibiting 
exploitative tactics in ads, 
removing misinformation related 
to coronavirus on Instagram, and 
various advertising restrictions.  
Facebook focuses on addressing what it 
calls ‘coordinated inauthentic 
behaviour”\’ which is where people or 
pages seek to mislead others (e.g. for 
financial or ideological purposes) about 
who they are or what they are doing . 
This approach focuses on deceptive 
behaviour, rather than content. Signals 
for this behaviour might include 
manipulation to make a network of 
accounts appear from one location 
when they are actually from another. 
This behaviour is detected and actioned 
by the platform through a combination 
of human investigators and technology 
that focus on the most sophisticated 
manipulation, as well as technology that 
proactively identifies patterns of this 
behaviour.114  
 
Facebook News partners with 
third party fact-checking 
operations, via the non-partisan 
International Fact-Checking 
Network (IFCN). In Australia, 
third-party fact checking is 
provided by Agence France 
Presse and AAP. 
Items found to be 'false' are 
demoted in news feed. A 'Click 
Gap' signal then ensures better 
qualify content is prominently 
shared on its network and 
unverified content is de-
emphasised on news feeds. 
Users attempting to share an 
item which has been 
factchecked as 'false' are 
prompted before doing so. 
Interstitial 'screens' are also 
used such that users have to 
'click through' to access the 
content. In applying these 
measures as part of their 
coronavirus response, Facebook 
found that 95% of users did not 
‘click through’ to view the ‘false’ 
content.115 
Facebook also includes user 
prompts such as 'Related 
Articles', 'Context Button', ‘More 
from this publisher’ and ‘Shared 
by Friends’ to display third-party 
fact checked articles. 
In relation to coronavirus, Facebook 
introduced prompts in the Facebook 
News Feed and Instagram Feed of 
every Australian user, directing them 
to official Australian Government 
information, and had similar 
partnerships in other countries. They 
worked with the Australian 
Government and other partners such 
as Atlassian to release a chatbot on 
WhatsApp where Australians can 
access the latest Government 
coronavirus information. A 
Coronavirus Information Center on 
Facebook, was established to assist 
users to connect with authoritative 
information and resources via 
Facebook and Instagram, supported 
local news organizations, and  the 
WHO Health Alert on WhatsApp.  
 
Facebook has a worldwide journalism 
project  providing news integrity 
initiatives to advance media literacy and 
increase trust in journalism.116 It has a 
user-facing Digital Literacy Library, with 
education modules for young people in a 
range of areas including verification 
skills.   
Facebook publishes monthly reports 
available about ‘coordinated inauthentic 
behaviour’ takedowns which can be 
used by researchers wanting to 
understand disinformation.117  
Facebook announced $1m grants118 to 
support coronavirus fact-checking. This 
is in addition to Facebook’s existing 
Journalism Project which provides 
funding for training and resources to 
over 400 newsrooms worldwide. 
Further news resourcing initiatives in 
2020 include an additional $125m to 
support the news industry coronavirus 
response. This includes grant resourcing 






114 See https://about.fb.com/news/2018/12/inside-feed-coordinated-inauthentic-behavior/. 
115 See https://about.fb.com/news/2020/04/covid-19-misinfo-update/. 
116 https://www.facebook.com/journalismproject.  
117 Facebook CIB reports, see https://about.fb.com/news/tag/coordinated-inauthentic-behavior/. 
118 See https://about.fb.com/news/2020/07/coronavirus/#supporting-fact-checkers.  
119 See https://about.fb.com/news/2020/07/coronavirus/#news-industry-investment.  
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Google Google enforces policies to 
address malicious behaviours and 
certain types of harmful 
misinformation. Policies across 
Google Search, Google News, 
YouTube, and advertising products 
outline behaviours that are 
prohibited– such as 
misrepresentation of one’s 
ownership or primary purpose on 
Google News and advertising 
products, or impersonation of 
other channels or individuals on 
YouTube.  
 
In addition, policies also prohibit 
certain types of harmful 
misinformation: for instance, 
YouTube and Ads policies prohibit 
deceptive manipulated media or 
information about voting 
procedure or candidate eligibility 
that contradict official government 
records. 
 
Google advertising policies include 
a ‘sensitive events’ policy which 
prohibits advertising that may try 
to capitalise on tragic events such 
as a natural disaster, conflict or 
death. For example, under this 
policy, Google has blocked 
numerous ads attempting to 
capitalise on the coronavirus 
pandemic. 
Google operates and enforces policies 
across its products such as Google 
Search, Google News, YouTube, 
advertising products that outline 
prohibited behaviours – such as 
misrepresentation of someone’s 
ownership or primary purpose on Google 
News and advertising products, or 
impersonation of other channels or 
individuals on YouTube.  
Google Search actively looks for and 
targets attempts to deceive its ranking 
systems.  
Google News has restrictions on the 
impersonation of any person or 
organisation, sites or accounts that 
engage in coordinated activity to 
mislead users – including, but not 
limited to, sites or accounts that 
misrepresent or conceal their country of 
origin or that direct content at users in 
another country under false pretences. 
YouTube manages information tied to 
elections through effective ranking 
algorithms, and policies against users 
that misrepresent themselves or who 
engage in other deceptive practices.120   
Google communicates findings on 
government-backed phishing, threats 
and disinformation. The Google Threat 
Analysis Group has recently launched a 
new quarterly bulletin to share 
information about actions against 
accounts attributed to coordinated 
influence campaigns.121   
Google provides users with 
sources of information and 
various safe navigation tools 
across its range of products. 
For example, Google Search and 
YouTube, display information 
panels in Search results to 
provide context and basic 
information about people, 
places, and events in relation to 
particular searches. 
Eligible channels on YouTube 
can apply for a verification mark 
which signals a channel is 
authentic - representing the real 
creator, brand, or entity it claims 
to be.  
Fact-check tags or snippets 
might show below links in 
Google Search and Google 
News, outlining that a specific 
piece of content purports to 
fact-check a claim made by a 
third party. 
For web developers building a 
web page that reviews a claim 
made by others, they can include 
‘ClaimReview’ structured data on 
their web page in order to have a 
summarized version of the fact 
check to display in Google 
Search.122 
Google products are equipped with 
tools to manage the vast amounts of 
material available on the web and 
deliver content tailored to users.  
For example, Google Search, Google 
News and YouTube utilise machine-
based learning to elevate 
authoritative, high-quality 
information algorithms, apply non-
partisan determination of news and 
search ranking and focus objectively 
on signals to detect inauthentic 
content.123 
YouTube also has specific product 
features to highlight authoritative 
content in the moments surrounding 
fast-developing breaking news 
events. These features included text-
based information panels with 
information from news 
organisations and a link directly to 
the news website. YouTube also 
works with news producers to 
highlight breaking news video 
content on the YouTube homepage 
and in the YouTube, search results 
where users are displaying particular 
interest in a relevant topic. 
In relation to coronavirus, Google 
launched a COVID-19 microsite124 
featuring the latest official health 
updates and Google resources on 
various aspects of the pandemic, 
along with data and insights. 
Google has developed and supported a 
number of programs to help users 
identify and avoid bad actors, and to 
better engage and make use of 
productive digital technology for the 
purpose of information discovery, 
communication and engaging with 
digital marketplaces. 
For example, the Google News Initiative 
(GNI) is a commitment of $300 million 
over three years to strengthen and 
elevate quality journalism on the web, 
including through building audience 
understanding and piloting digital 
publishing models.  
Digital Springboard is a free, in-person, 
digital skills training program offered 
through a national network of 
community organisations and 
institutions that promotes the core 
digital skills needed to thrive in work and 
life. 
The eSmart Digital License program is 
designed to help Australian children to 
play safe and stay safe, online. The 
program offers three different versions 
of age-appropriate content to help 
children understand what to look out for 
on the web, and how to deal with any 
threats when they arise. 
The Alannah and Madeline Media 
Literacy Lab - announced in 2019 and 
launched in July 2020 - is designed to 
teach students to critically analyse and 
navigate the online environment. It 
provides secondary school teachers with 
 
 
120 See https://kstatic.googleusercontent.com/files/ . 
121 See https://blog.google/threat-analysis-group/. 
122 See https://developers.google.com/search/docs/data-types/factcheck.  
123 See https://www.blog.google/documents/37/How_Google_Fights_Disinformation.pdf  p11.  
124 See https://www.google.com.au/covid19/. 
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Australian curriculum-aligned content, 
classroom, and remote delivery ideas.  
Google also provides datasets and 
synthesised content for researchers 
working on AI detection tools.125  
Apple Apple’s Podcast Connect policy 
covers submissions to Apple 
Podcasts, including Apple 
Podcasts for iOS and Apple 
Podcasts for Mac. These 
guidelines address inauthentic 
content ‘designed to mislead’ 
users and other overlapping policy 
areas to disinformation such as 
hate speech (‘Nazi propaganda’) 
and spam.126 
Apple maintains policies which address 
elements of behaviours and content of 
mis- and disinformation in their App 
store and Podcast content.127 Apple 
website terms include prohibitions on 
product enabled with automatic devices 
or other’ or ‘inauthentic’ capabilities.128 
 
Apple News is focussed on 
elevating the visibility of stories 
from credible, known news 
outlets. They also have 
Australian editorial team that 
curate and highlight high quality 
news content.129  
In response to coronavirus, Apple 
introduced new App Store measures 
for App submissions. Apps that 
contain medical information must 
now be submitted by a recognised 
authority. 
In 2019, Apple announced130 a new 
literacy education program in 
conjunction with The News Literacy 
Project which offers nonpartisan, 
independent media literacy programs, 
including a ‘misinformation guide’.   
 
 
125 See https://www.blog.google/outreachinitiatives/google-news-initiative/advancing-research-fake-audio-detection/.  
126 See https://help.apple.com/itc/podcasts_connect/#/itc1723472cb. 
127 See https://help.apple.com/itc/podcasts_connect/#/itc1723472cb.  
128 See https://www.apple.com/legal/internet-services/terms/site.html. 
129 See https://appleinsider.com/articles/19/05/12/editorial-can-apple-news-kill-fake-news-and-save-journalism. 
130 See https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/03/apple-teams-with-media-literacy-programs-in-the-us-and-europe/.  




Redbubble Community and 
Content guidelines include the 
prohibition of ‘harmful 
misinformation’ which it defines 
as ‘any misleading or false 
information that harms or 
significantly threatens public 
safety’.131 
Change.org has restrictions in its 
Community Guidelines on 
misleading content and will 
‘remove content which is verifiably 
incorrect and which has the 
potential to cause harm to our 
users’. It also has restrictions on 
impersonation and hate speech, 
which it considers relevant in 
addressing some harmful 
misinformation and disinformation 
content.  
  
Verizon Media has a policy on non-
genuine behaviour, as well as 
restrictions on content designed that 
could mislead, defraud, or otherwise, this 
includes attempts to disenfranchise 
voters or otherwise maliciously interfere 
in elections. This includes restrictions on 
causing ‘confusion between you and any 
other person, organization, or company, 
or mislead users about the origin of the 
content you post or your affiliation with 
any other person, organization, or 
company.’  
 
Adobe is  working with software 
tool companies, publishers, 
social media companies, human 
rights organisations and 
academic researchers to 
develop an open industry 
standard for content attribution.  
 
Creators and publishers will be 
able to imprint data attribution 
on material they create and 
share. As a result, users 
(individuals, or news 
organisations) will be able to 
determine the provenance of an 
item using the metadata and 
determine whether it has been 
manipulated.132 
. 
Verizon Media created a coronavirus 
hub, across the Yahoo ecosystem 
that includes real-time news about 
the global pandemic.133  
 
Adobe and UC Berkeley researchers 
have collaborated on AI research 
designed to detect modification of 
images made with Photoshop’s Face 
Aware Liquify feature.134 
 
The Trust Project (an international 
consortium of news operators) has 
developed 'trust indicators' which are 
used to surface and display quality 




131 See https://help.redbubble.com/hc/en-us/articles/202270929-Community-and-Content-Guidelines#misinformation.  
132 See https://theblog.adobe.com/adobe-reinforces-commitment-to-content-authenticity-previews-technical-white-paper/. 
133 See https://www.verizon.com/about/news/our-response-coronavirus. 
134 See https://theblog.adobe.com/adobe-research-and-uc-berkeley-detecting-facial-manipulations-in-adobe-photoshop/.  
135 See https://thetrustproject.org/trust-project-launches-indicators/. 
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Industry initiatives in depth 
Here we further illustrate the details of some of the initiatives in Table 1, under the five 
common themes identified above. 
Policies responding to mis- and disinformation 
In February 2020, Twitter implemented a policy to manage inauthentic content, in addition to 
its efforts focused on platform manipulation behaviour.136 The new rules prohibit users from 
deceptively sharing synthetic or manipulated media that are likely to cause harm. This 
included the initiative to label Tweets containing synthetic and manipulated content in order 
to better understand the context of information. The new approach uses the following 
criteria:137 
1. Whether media is synthetic or manipulated and the degree to which it has been 
edited to alter composition (i.e. sequence, timing, or framing) and whether the 
affected media contains a real person in a fabricated or simulated circumstance. 
2. Whether the media was shared in a deceptive manner and the motivation of the 
sharer. This assessment involves considering the context of surrounding 
material, associated tweets, meta data and the profile of person, and questions 
around whether the content likely to impact public safety or cause serious harm. 
Tweets most likely to be removed are those sharing manipulated media which are likely to 
cause harm. Considerations include: threats to physical safety of other people; risks of mass 
violence or civil unrest; targeting others with aim to silence; or threatening privacy or ability 
of others to freely express themselves. 
  
 




136 See https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/manipulated-media. 
137 See https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/new-approach-to-synthetic-and-manipulated-
media.html. 
138 See https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/manipulated-media. 
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Measures to address inauthentic behaviour  
Facebook’s approach to disinformation is focused on addressing ‘coordinated inauthentic 
behaviour’ (CIB) that seek to manipulate the public. As well as the use of technology, 
Facebook has a cross-disciplinary team of over 200 people focused on finding and 
disrupting the following aspects. 
1. Sophisticated influence operations aimed to manipulate public opinion. It considers 
these activities to be largely politically motivated, aimed at gaining influence for a 
strategic goal. Within this category, Facebook observes two further categories 
activities that it works to stop 
• CIB in the context of domestic, non-state campaigns. When this is 
discovered, Facebook removes both inauthentic and authentic accounts, 
Pages and Groups directly involved in this activity. 
• CIB from foreign or government actors. When this is discovered, Facebook 
employs broad enforcement measures including the removal of every on-
platform property connected to the operation itself and the people and 
organisations behind it.  
2. High volume inauthentic behaviours like spam and fake engagement. It considers 
these activities to be largely financially motivated. 
In order to maintain what it calls ‘continuous enforcement’, Facebook uses automated and 
manual detection to remove accounts and Pages connected to networks previously 
removed. 
For the last three years, Facebook has released periodic reports on this behaviour for law 
enforcement, researchers and the public to better understand the nature of this 
manipulation, with a focus on the first category above of sophisticated influence operations. 
In April 2020, Facebook removed eight networks of accounts, including two foreign or 
government actors from Russia and Iran, and six domestic operations within the US, Georgia, 
Myanmar and Mauritania.139  
Credibility signalling 
Adobe is working to establish open industry standards for content authentication for digital 
media. The Content Authenticity Initiative (CAI) is an initiative announced by Adobe in 
November 2019140  in partnership with Twitter and the New York Times. The project is aimed 
at attribution in the creation of digital content, such as images.  
The initiative recognises that content attribution for creators and publishers is essential for 
user trust yet balances this with the fact that modification is often a necessary part of 
 
 
139 See https://about.fb.com/news/2020/05/april-cib-report/. 
140 CAI Announcement from Adobe. See 
https://s23.q4cdn.com/979560357/files/doc_events/2019/11/1/110419AdobeNYTandTwitterAnnounceConte
ntAuthenticityInitiative.pdf. 
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creative process.  That is to say, not all ‘altered’ content is mis- or disinformation; instead, 
CAI aims to balance that challenge by providing users with information to discern for 
themselves what is malicious.  
Central to this idea is development of an open industry standard with cross-industry 
participation designed to detect and communicate to users, the provenance of a modified 
item of digital content (‘asset’). This will allow end users to evaluate an ‘asset’ and discern 
for themselves whether content is mis- or disinformation, within the particular context its 
being viewed. This information may consist of where and when a picture was taken and by 
whom. If speech or voice manipulation is part of that assessment, a user may be provided 
with information on the video’s voice speed compared with the technical standard for that 
type of content.141 
A summit in early 2020 brought together stakeholders from technical and content teams, to 
launch collaborative working groups and partnerships on designing an attribution tool to 
assess content authenticity and the provenance of digital content.142 The discussion to date 
has considered three key areas:   
1. Detection of ‘deep fakes’143 and similar content needs a refined approach. Algorithms 
and manual detection are able to identify intentionally misleading, but these must 
keep pace with the increasing sophistication of editing tools to remain effective. 
Detection must also balance the fact that not all manipulated content is malicious; 
for example, movies are edited, photographs are enhanced for aesthetics.  
2. Attribution or version history can empower users with information about who created, 
altered and shared a particular piece of media. However, care needs to be taken in 
using the solution so as to mitigate unintended consequences. For example, care 
must be taken so as not to invalidate or create risk for genuine photojournalists who 
may be reliant on anonymity to carry out their work.   
3. Consumer education will assist creators to understand disinformation and work with 
tools and techniques to eliminate it. Programs focused on this skill can equip 
consumers with tools and information to better evaluate digital media and 







143 The term ‘deep fakes’ is defined as realistic photo, audio, video, and other forgeries generated with artificial 
intelligence (AI) technologies. See Kelly M. Sayler & Laurie A. Harris, CRS In Focus IF11333, Deep Fakes and 
National Security (Oct. 14, 2019).   
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The CAI collaborators published a whitepaper Setting the Standard for Content Attribution144 
in August 2020 in which they stated: 
The initial mission of the CAI is to develop the industry standard for content 
attribution.  We will provide a layer of robust, tamper-evident attribution and history 
data built upon XMP, Schema.org and other metadata standards that goes far beyond 
common uses today. This attribution information will be bound to the assets it 
describes, which will in turn reduce friction for creators sharing the attribution data and 
enable intuitive experiences for consumers who use the information to help them 
decide what to trust.   
The whitepaper also went on to highlight that 
Increasing trust in media requires the ongoing engagement of diverse communities. 
The CAI does not prescribe a unified single platform for authenticity, but instead 
presents a set of standards that can be used to create and reveal attribution and 
history for images, documents, time-based media (video, audio) and streaming 
content. Although the initial implementations will focus on imagery, the initiative aims 
to specify a largely uniform method for enabling attribution from various points of view 
through which diverse stakeholders can build decentralized knowledge graphs about 
the trustworthiness of media.  
Google recently announced measures to address authenticity in image search, particularly 
images recirculating in viral misinformation cycles. Fact-check labelling will be utilised to 
provide context for image search results. The initiative will draw on services provided by 
third-party fact-checkers and publishers who will now be able to tag fact-checked images 
using ClaimReview (a method for publishers to communicate to search engines that an 
image has been verified, described in Table 1).  
Other initiatives reach beyond the realm of images. Facebook has been working in 
partnership with IFCN organisations on methods to identify and constrain the sharing of 
false news. Technology and machine learning are utilised to identify potential material likely 
to contain misinformation and prioritise those for third party fact-checkers to review and 
rate.  The ratings which can be applied are ‘False’, ‘Partly False’, ‘False Headline’ or ‘True’. 
Generally, a false rating will result in Facebook lowering the article in its News Feed with the 
aim of reducing exposure to the false news.  The News Feed also displays articles on the 
same topic, from third-party fact-checkers, immediately below the false story.   
Microsoft partners with NewsGuard, using its credibility ratings plugin on its Edge browser 
and Bing search engine. NewsGuard provides ‘nutrition’ labelling on predominately ‘hard 
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editorial information assessed against nine criteria that NewsGuard has developed. These 
include Red and Green (pass/fail), Yellow (satire) and Grey (platform/user generated 
information).  The aim is for transparency, and users can also assess information based on 
the criterion of individual importance. 
Twitter also introduced fact-checking and credibility measures to counter misleading 
information. These have been appearing as labels and warning messages attached to a fact-
checked tweet and which provide additional context or alternative sources of information on 
Tweets containing disputed or misleading information. Depending on the nature of the 
information, Twitter may decide to action in the following ways: 
 
Twitter’s action based on three broad categories 145 
Measures to promote quality content 
In its News and Search services, Google has elevated high quality information in spaces 
such as ‘Top Stories’ Carousel or our ‘News’ Tab.   A similar method applies to YouTube 
content, which highlights relevant and verified news content on its homepage.  In the context 
of its coronavirus response, Google enhanced their search so searches for virus information 
prompted an ‘SOS Alert’ which returned prominently displayed news and information from 
trusted health sources including the WHO and Centre for Disease Control.  
LinkedIn has focussed on providing accurate public health information during the 
coronavirus pandemic through editorial curation. ‘Daily Rundown’ is LinkedIn’s editorial 
function developed that utilises push notifications to distribute health and economic 
recovery information from authoritative and verified sources to its members.  Their editorial 
team also curates news stories with surrounding context from other verified sources (e.g., 
government policy announcements, public event) and where relevant, may add high quality 
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As detailed in Table 1, the coronavirus pandemic saw a range of digital services partner with 
the Australian Government and other health authorities to elevate alerts and other credible 
information to guide Australians in response.   
Education and media literacy efforts 
In addition to a focus on information, various education and media literacy initiatives have 
also focused on images. Facebook and Microsoft have invested in the Deepfake Detection 
Challenge research initiative. This is a program focussed on building better tools for deep 
fake detection and recognised the collaborative effort required to produce solutions. 
Technical researchers around the world are given the opportunity to access grants and data 
sets to develop innovative new technologies for use in managing inauthentic content, 
particularly manipulated media.   
Facebook has also partnered with Reuters, the world’s largest multimedia news provider, to 
help newsrooms worldwide to identify ‘deep fakes’ and manipulated media through a free 
online training course.  This is one example of a broader trend in such efforts to initiate 
partnerships with news organisations, such as the Google News Initiative (GNI) which 
provides fellowships, training, technology research and grants for news organisations, 
journalists and fact checking outlets.  
Industry also partner with civil society on educational efforts. For example, Twitter has 
partnered with UNESCO to publish a new handbook for educators, entitled Teaching and 
Learning with Twitter aimed at raising awareness of media and information literacy among 
parents, educators.  Google has partnered with the Australian non-profit Alannah & 
Madeleine Foundation on the development digital media literacy tool, which teaches high 
school students to critically analyse and navigate the online environment.  
Investment in this area also extends to support for research and institutions involved in 
undertaking vital research in machine learning and other non-technical disinformation 
responses. On this front, Twitter has released several tranches of data sets from European, 
Asian and Middle East jurisdictions, for independent analyses and research into platform 
manipulation across several jurisdictions.  
Together, the main platforms are a key contributor to various First Draft News projects.  
Twitter, Facebook (via the Journalism Project) and Google’s News Initiative each provides 
resources, and collaboration on global projects such as the CrossCheck initiative and First 
Draft’s coronavirus resources hub for reporters. 
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3 International initiatives 
The leading example of regulatory initiatives to address disinformation is the EU Code of 
Practice on Disinformation. Having been implemented in late 2018, it has been adopted by a 
number of global digital platforms and is now the subject of independent assessment. While 
we considered the definitions used under this Code and its key commitments in relation to 
the draft Australian Code of Practice in Section 1, in this section we explore the Code in 
further depth in relation to the scope of the commitments and its widespread adoption. We 
also explore approaches adopted in other jurisdictions to mis- and disinformation. 
Our review of other jurisdictions has not revealed a country-level approach or instrument 
directly comparable to the EU Code. The closest case is the code developed in Taiwan, 
although there is also a code implemented in India designed to strengthen confidence in the 
election process.  
The review of jurisdiction has, however, revealed a range of regulatory and non-regulatory 
measures to address disinformation. Proactive measures adopted by government, many 
being education-based and some in collaboration with industry, are attempting to either stop 
the spread of disinformation or to replace false information before it has time to spread.  
Some initiatives involve government in detecting false information and, while innovative, 
there does appear to be some risk that measures of this kind could impede on freedom of 
expression by curbing commentary on government initiatives. There is a public debate over 
this aspect in South Korea, with some advocating greater use of self-regulation and others 
encouraging government intervention.  
This initial review of other select jurisdictions revealed an interesting divergence in aspects 
that are considered important to address.  
• A number of countries are attempting to strengthen confidence in the electoral process, 
but for others (such as the Czech Republic and South Korea) a primary concern is the 
presence of a neighbouring state known to be active in the spread of disinformation.  
• For both India and Taiwan, disinformation about natural disasters is of particular concern. 
In both countries, legislation has been used for these measures; legislation is also being 
contemplated in the US to address the specific problem of deep fakes.  
• In Canada, where, since May 2019 there has been a Digital Charter that includes 
disinformation, legislation has been used in a more general way to promote transparency, 
specifically recognising the role that digital platforms play in modern democracies, while 
encouraging platforms to enforce to policies to limit the potential that they are 
manipulated to spread disinformation.   
We now turn to the EU Code and then several other international initiatives. 
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The EU Code of Practice 
The Code and its signatories 
The European Union Code of Practice on Disinformation (‘the EU Code’) is a voluntary, self-
regulatory code that is designed to minimise the spread of online disinformation and fake 
news. The EU Code recognises the importance of open and transparent debates for 
democracy and broader civil society. As noted above, there are three principal elements in 
its definition of ‘disinformation’: ‘verifiably false or misleading information’ which ‘is created, 
presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public’ and 
which ‘may cause public harm’.146 
To address the challenge posed by disinformation the Code sets out 11 objectives that 
signatories recognise as important in efforts to address the dissemination of disinformation. 
These objectives are followed by 15 commitments that signatories can choose to commit 
to. These commitments cover five areas: 
1. Scrutiny of ad placements 
2. Political advertising and issue-based advertising 
3. Integrity of services 
4. Empowering consumers 
5. Empowering the research community. 
Each signatory chooses its own commitments, allowing it to cater its response to the nature 
of the organisation.147 
The Code also sets out reporting provisions. There are a further six commitments under 
measuring and monitoring the Code’s effectiveness. Broadly, signatories are to provide self-
assessments of their performance, evaluated against the commitments under the Code that 
they have entered. Initially, these reports were to be provided monthly, from January to May 
2019, and aimed to coincide with the European elections. Following this, the first annual self-
assessments were provided in October 2019. Based on these reports there has so far been: 
• A summary and analysis of the self-assessments conducted by the EU Commission, 
and 




146 As noted in Section One above, the definition includes within it a definition of ‘public harm’ and is followed by 
a note on scope which excludes content such as misleading advertising. See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236. 
147 European Commission, ‘EU Code of Practice on Disinformation’ (26 September 2018). See 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation, (‘EU Code’), p 1. 
148 See https://erga-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ERGA-2019-report-published-2020-LQ.pdf.. 
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The Code adopts the definition used in the European Commission Communication ‘Tackling 
online disinformation: a European approach’. As explored in Section 1, this defines 
disinformation as, ‘verifiably false or misleading information’ which, cumulatively, 
(a) “is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive 
the public”; and 
(b) “may cause public harm”, intended as “threats to democratic political and 
policymaking processes as well as public goods such as the protection of EU citizens’ 
health, the environment or security.”’149 
The Code clarifies what is not disinformation. Particularly, disinformation ‘does not include 
misleading advertising, reporting errors, satire and parody, or clearly identified partisan news 
and commentary, and is without prejudice to binding legal obligations, self-regulatory 
advertising codes, and standards regarding misleading advertising.’150 
In January 2020, the Code had 15 signatories. This covered the major platforms (Facebook, 
Google, and Twitter), tech companies (Microsoft and Mozilla), and trade associations and 
other organisations.151 In June 2020, TikTok became a signatory. 
Code development  
The threat of disinformation was first flagged by the European Council in 2015. Initially 
focusing on the issue of ‘fake news’ the approach of the Commission shifted to focus on 
disinformation in part in response to the Cambridge Analytica incident.152 In April 2018, an 
EU-wide Code of Practice on Disinformation was first proposed. This Code was announced 
in September 2018 and signed in October 2018. This Code is accompanied with the broader 
European Action Plan against Disinformation.  
The Commission plays an oversight role regarding the implementation of the Code, reporting 
back to the European Council. As mentioned above, the Commission was responsible for 
collating a summary and analysis of the initial monthly reports and the first annual reports 
provided by signatories. Further analysis of the functioning of the Code is conducted by 
external organisations under the direction of the Commission, with an assessment delivered 
in 2020. 
The process also included a Sounding Board – a committee of representatives from media, 
civil society, fact checkers and academia established to provide an opinion on the drafting of 
 
 
149 EU Code 1 referencing: ‘European Commission Communication ‘Tackling Online Disinformation: A European 
Approach’ paragraph 2.1. In paragraph (b), ‘intended as’ refers to the original definition in the Communication, 
which put it this way: ‘Public harm comprises threats to democratic political and policy-making processes as 
well as …’. See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0236. 
150 EU Code (n 1) p 1. 
151 Links to the signatures can be accessed here: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/roadmaps-
implement-code-practice-disinformation. 
152 Peter Chase, ‘The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation: The Difficulty of Regulating a Nebulous Problem’ (29 
August 2019), p 3. 
Accessible at: <https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/EU_Code_Practice_Disinformation_Aug_2019.pdf> 
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the Code. This committee flagged two initial concerns: the absence of clearly measurable 
key performance indicators or other measurable objectives; and a perceived lack of clear 
and meaningful commitments forming common guidelines for signatories which was said to 
limit its effective operation as self-regulation).153 However, the Commission disagreed with 
this comment, saying the Code is consistent with existing principles for self-regulation set by 
the Commission.154 These criticisms are incorporated into commitments 16-21 of the Code 
which spell out Key Performance Indicators for reporting on the effectiveness of the Code. 
Implementation and assessment 
The reporting obligations under the EU Code have been extensive. Every month from January 
to May 2019, Facebook, Google and Twitter were obligated under the Commission’s action 
plan to demonstrate how they are fulfilling the requirements of the Code.155 They were then 
required to provide annual reports. The Commission would then provide its own assessment 
each month. It notes some reservations, particularly around metrics used and explanations 
of action taken, in the initial month.156 In the final monthly report, the Commission noted 
improvements – for example, Google, Facebook and Twitter had all improved the scrutiny of 
ad placements to limit malicious click-baiting practices and reduced advertising revenues 
for spreaders by, for example, removing ads and closing ad accounts as a result of 
deceptive or inauthentic behaviour.157  
In its report on the first annual reports, the Commission notes, for example, higher 
transparency around platforms’ policies addressing disinformation, efforts by platforms to 
disrupt advertising and monetisation connected with disinformation, and measures to 
increase transparency of political advertising. But it also noted continuing reservations 
about the metrics provided by the platforms and a lack of progress on joined-up efforts ‘to 
identify persistent or egregious purveyors of disinformation and develop indicators for the 
trustworthiness of media sources, for the development and deployment of ad scrutiny and 
brand safety measures’.158  
 
 
153 Sounding Board, ‘The Sounding Board’s Unanimous Final Opinion on the So-Called Code of Practice’ (24 
September 2018). See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation. 
154 Peter Chase, above, 9.  
155 European Commission ‘Code of Practice against disinformation: Commission recognises platform’s efforts 
ahead of the European elections’. See 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_19_2570. 
156 European Commission, ‘Code of Practice on Disinformation Intermediate Targeted Monitoring – Intermediate 
Targeted Monitoring – January Reports’. See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/first-monthly-
intermediate-results-eu-code-practice-against-disinformation.  
157 European Commission, ‘Code of Practice on Disinformation Intermediate Targeted Monitoring – Intermediate 
Targeted Monitoring – May Reports’. See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/last-intermediate-
results-eu-code-practice-against-disinformation. 
158 European Commission, ‘Annual self-assessment reports of signatories to the code of practice on 
disinformation 2019’, (29 October 2019). See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/annual-self-
assessment-reports-signatories-code-practice-disinformation-2019  p 5, 9, 12. 
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Critiques of the EU Code 
An independent assessment of the EU Code was conducted by The European Regulators 
Group for Audio-visual Media Services (ERGA).159  ERGA regarded the Code as an important 
step in the process of building a new relationship between its signatories, the EU and 
National AV Regulators. However, it considers there is a need for greater transparency about 
how the Code is being implemented, noting also that the self-reporting cannot be 
independently verified and that there is also no uniformity in the procedures and the 
definitions that have been adopted by the different platforms. ERGA suggests that all of the 
platforms be required to comply with the same obligations in a uniform manner and adopt 
more precise definitions, procedures and commitments. Paul-Jasper Dittrich argues for an 
EU statutory layer of general principles, a co-regulatory layer comprising an industry-
developed Code, and company-specific measures to implement the Code which are 
approved by the EC.160 Separately, James Pamment161 has noted that although there have 
been areas of progress, the weak points of this system include how there is a lack of detail 
of data in the signatories’ reports and success metrics for their efforts, and an inconsistency 
of approaches. He states that the inconsistent terminology ‘indicates a lack of consensus 
among key stakeholders regarding the scope of the issue and therefore its potential 
solutions’. He states that clarity over objectives and terminology is required.  
These criticisms appear consistent with comments in follow-up to recent first phase 
baseline reporting which formed part of the Code’s monitoring and reporting programme.162   
Despite overall praise for signatories’ progress on implementing policies cross the five 
pillars of the Code,163 the Commission’s assessment expressed shortcomings in the ‘lack of 
common understandings of the scope of fundamental concepts and of uniform definitions 
of key operational terms [which] inhibits the effective implementation of measures by the 
signatories’.164   Of particular note were the lack of uniformity of reporting procedures, fact-
checking approaches and distinctions between types of false or misleading content and 
manipulative behaviour intended to amplify its dissemination online. These were considered 
 
 
159 ERGA ‘ERGA Report on Disinformation: Assessment of the Implementation of the Code of Practice’. See 
https://erga-online.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ERGA-2019-report-published-2020-LQ.pdf. 
160 Paul-Jasper Dittrich: ‘Tackling the spread of disinformation Why a co-regulatory approach is the right way 
forward for the EU’ (December, 2019) Jacques Delors Centre: Hertie School. See https://www.bertelsmann-
stiftung.de/fileadmin/files/BSt/Publikationen/GrauePublikationen/EZ_JDI_BST_Policy_Paper_Disinformation_Di
ttrich_2019_ENG.pdf  p 7.  
161 James Pamment, ‘EU Code of Practice on Disinformation: Briefing Note for the New European Commission’ 
(March, 2020). See https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/03/eu-code-of-practice-on-disinformation-
briefing-note-for-new-european-commission-pub-81187. 
162 ‘First Baseline Reports – Fighting COVID-19 disinformation Monitoring Programme’, European Commission 
(Web Page, 10 September 2020). See  https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/first-baseline-
reports-fighting-covid-19-disinformation-monitoring-programme. 
163 The Staff Working Document ‘sets out the key findings of the Commission services’ assessment of the 
implementation and effectiveness of the Code of Practice on Disinformation during its initial 12-months period 
of operation’. See https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=69212. 
164 European Commission, ‘Staff Working Document: Assessment of the Code of Practice on Disinformation - 
Achievements and areas for further improvement’, SWD (2020) 180 (10 September 2020) p 13. 
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‘necessary for framing appropriate responses by the platforms and other relevant 
stakeholders’.165 
Such critiques need to be balanced with goals in Australia to have a code adopted by a 
variety of digital services that will have arguably different approaches, and varying 
capabilities for reporting. 
India  
For the 2019 general elections, the social media platforms (including Facebook, WhatsApp, 
Twitter, Google, ShareChat, TikTok) and an industry body, The Internet and Mobile 
Association of India, agreed to a Voluntary Code of Ethics which was in effect from 20 
March 2019 until the general elections.166 This was at the request of the Election 
Commission of India, which summoned these organisations to introduce a voluntary code of 
ethics.167 The purpose of the Code was to ‘identify the measures that Participants can put in 
place to increase confidence in the electoral process’. In September 2019, it was announced 
that the social media platforms, as directed by the Electoral Commission, have agreed to 
follow this voluntary Code of Ethics for all future elections.168  
It is a three-page document where eight commitments are listed. It does not refer to 
‘disinformation’ or related terms; instead, participants made general commitments, such as 
to ‘facilitate access to information regarding electoral matters’ and ‘to voluntarily undertake 
information, education and communication campaigns to build awareness including 
electoral laws and other related instructions’. 
In late 2019, the Press Information Bureau (a government agency) set up a fact-checking 
unit to verify news that relates to the Indian government.169 The West Bengal government 
has also been preparing a database of fake news stories that have been distributed on 
social media over the past few years.170 Furthermore, the Uttar Pradesh police have set up 
‘digital armies’, which comprise of prominent residents along with ex-service personnel, 
 
 
165 Ibid p 12. 
166 Tariq Ahmed ‘Government Responses to Disinformation on Social Media Platforms: India’ (September, 2019) 
Library of Congress (September 2019). See https://www.loc.gov/law/help/social-media-
disinformation/india.php. 
167 Yatti Soni ‘Ahead of State Elections, Social Media to Follow Voluntary Code of Ethics’ (September, 2019) INC 
42. See https://inc42.com/buzz/ahead-of-state-elections-social-media-to-follow-voluntary-code-of-ethics/. 
168 Taruka Srivastav ‘Social Media Platforms Agree to Follow ‘Code of Ethics’ In India for Elections’ (September, 
2019) The Drum. See https://www.thedrum.com/news/2019/09/27/social-media-platforms-agree-follow-code-
ethics-india-elections. 
169 ‘Press Information Bureau sets up fact-checking unit to combat fake news related to govt’ (November,2019) 
The Print. See https://theprint.in/india/press-information-bureau-sets-up-fact-checking-unit-to-combat-fake-
news-related-to-govt/328248/. 
170 Daniel Funke and Daniela Flamini  ‘A Guide to Anti-Misinformation Actions Around the World’ Poynter. See 
https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/anti-misinformation-actions. 
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teachers, doctors, advocates, and journalists.171 This involves WhatsApp groups being 
formed to keep an eye on potential disinformation and other damaging posts.172 All the state 
police stations will manage these groups and the ‘digital volunteers’ will share posts that 
spread disinformation with the police as well as disseminate correct information.173  
In terms of law, there is no specific provision in Indian law that deals with fake news.174 
However, there are several offences in India’s Penal Code that criminalise certain forms of 
speech that may be able to be invoked in cases of misinformation.175 Moreover, there are 
other relevant laws. For example, according to the Disaster Management Act, it is a crime to 
make or circulate a false alarm about a disaster or its severity. Furthermore, internet 
shutdowns by the Indian government are not uncommon.176 In October 2018, it was reported 
that the Indian government ‘turned off’ the internet more than 100 times in 2018 to curb the 
spread of rumours on WhatsApp.177 
Sweden  
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (knows as the MSB) is a government agency with 
the task of increasing awareness among residents of the threats that arise with 
disinformation and influence campaigns.178 The MSB updated its public emergency 
preparedness brochure so that it has a section on disinformation.179 In the lead up to the 
2018 September elections, MSB educated local election authorities and various 
governmental bodies on how to detect influence campaigns from foreign entities.180  
Furthermore, it published a handbook in 2018 called Countering Information Influence 
Activities: A Handbook for Communicators which provided resources for people working in 
public administration.181 Interestingly, the 2018 Minister for Digitisation worked alongside 
Facebook to establish a Facebook ‘hotline’182 where both the MSB and all political parties 
 
 
171 Ibid.  




174 Above n 166 
175 Ibid.  
176 Funke and Flamini ‘A Guide to Anti-Misinformation Actions Around the World’.  
177  Timothy Mclaughlin ‘How WhatsApp Fuels Fake News and Violence in India’ (December, 2018) Wired. See 
https://www.wired.com/story/how-whatsapp-fuels-fake-news-and-violence-in-india/. 
178 Elin Hofverberg, ‘Government Responses to Disinformation on Social Media Platforms: Sweden’ 
(September,2019) Library of Congress. See https://www.loc.gov/law/help/social-media-
disinformation/sweden.php. 
179 Ibid.  
180 Christina La Cour, ‘Governments Countering Disinformation: The Case of Sweden’ Disinfo Portal. See 
https://disinfoportal.org/governments-countering-disinformation-the-case-of-sweden. 
181 Hofverberg, ‘Government Responses to Disinformation on Social Media Platforms: Sweden’  
182 Ibid. 
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could let Facebook know if they came across problematic content during the election 
campaign. 
Through the Swedish Innovation Authority, the government has also invested in a ‘new 
digital platform’ that is designed to curb the spread of online disinformation.183 It has been 
funded by ‘Swedish Television’ and other Swedish broadcasters and this platform has three 
functions to help filter news: ‘an “automated news assessment service” for evaluating news, 
a “personalised engine” for countering filter bubbles and a “fact assistant” for automating 
fact-checking processes and discarding fake and irrelevant news’.184 Additionally, the State 
Media Council (a government agency) has developed teaching materials to help students 
learn to identify online disinformation.  
Foreign law expert Elin Hofverberg writes that Sweden has criminalised many acts that 
relate to the dissemination of propaganda.185 For example, accepting remuneration from a 
foreign entity to spread propaganda in Sweden is a crime.  Additionally, spreading 
information that could be dangerous to the national security of Sweden is a crime.  She also 
writes that it is a crime ‘to intentionally affect public opinion or limit the freedom of a 
political organisation or a union or trade association to act and thereby jeopardize the 
freedom of speech and association through the use of force, coercion, or criminal threats’.186  
Additionally, spreading information that could be dangerous to the national security of 
Sweden is a crime, as is accepting some form of remuneration from foreign entities to 
spread disinformation in Sweden.187  
Taiwan  
Digital platforms have collaborated on a code of practice in Taiwan, a territory that faces 
particular problems with disinformation.188  
The Code begins with a preface explaining that the guidelines allow the participating parties 
to adopt various approaches when implementing the guidelines. The Code then outlines its 
goal which is ‘to unite non-governmental forces in Taiwan so as to promote the prevention 
 
 
183 Above n 180. 
184 Ibid.  
185 Elin Hofverberg, ‘Government Responses to Disinformation on Social Media Platforms: Sweden’ 
(September,2019) Library of Congress. See https://www.loc.gov/law/help/social-media-
disinformation/sweden.php.  
186 Above n 181. 
187Ibid.  
188 The Code is publicly available only in Mandarin and has been translated by a NAATI-credentialled translator 
for this analysis. The title has been translated as ‘Self-discipline Practice Guidelines for Disinformation 
Prevention and Control’, although a Mandarin-speaking legal academic consulted on this issue advised that 
‘self-discipline’ can also be translated as ‘self-regulation’. For the Mandarin version, see 
https://www.tahr.org.tw/sites/default/files/u87/190621_disinformation_code_of_practice_taiwan.pdf.  
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and control mechanism of disinformation’. Next, the Code provides a definition for 
disinformation.  
‘The term “Disinformation” referred to in the Guidelines should conform to all the 
following three descriptions. When determining whether a piece of information can be 
classified as “disinformation”, one should strictly abide by the freedom of speech and 
take into account international academic and practical consensus:  
1) For the purpose of maliciously deceiving the public or creating improper 
economic gains (malicious-intention)  
2) So as to create and spread verifiable false information or misleading 
information (false-action)  
3) And is possibly compromising the sound operation of democratic politics 
or public safety (harmful-result)  
The concept of “disinformation” in the Guidelines does not include wrong reports, 
satirical and imitative works and commercial advertisements that are not politically 
misleading.’ 
The Code then goes into the four points, which form the ‘Content of the Guidelines’. These 
four points are the participating parties’ commitment to: 
• ‘continuous investment in technology for the purpose of establishing a 
disinformation prevention mechanism and relevant safeguards’; 
• ‘continuous increase in advertisement transparency and management’; 
• ‘cooperating with a third party and government authorities to establish and 
maintain an independent, transparent and impartial supervision mechanism’; and  
• ‘through the training of digital literacy and media literacy, assist the public in 
acquiring the ability to identify disinformation’.   
There are three or four more specific commitments under each of these areas.  
Finally, the Code ends with the ‘Implementation and Prospect’ section where it states that 
the participating parties implement part or all of the guidelines, agree to conduct regular 
reviews and ‘continue to have organisational conversations with relevant government 
authorities in an active manner.’   
Separately from the operation of the Code, the government works in cooperation with civil 
society actors and fact-checking groups outside government. Two non-profit organisations, 
Taiwan Media Watch and the Association for Quality Journalism, have jointly founded the 
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‘Taiwan Fact Check Centre’.189  This fact check centre uses a ‘back-end tool’ that is provided 
by Facebook to track viral posts that are misleading and will fact-check them.190  Once the 
post is confirmed to be incorrect, Facebook will inform anyone who had shared the post that 
it was not true.191 The government of Taiwan as well as political figures and had encouraged 
people to engage with the FactCheck centre.192  
In addition, the Taiwanese government requires state agencies to refute false claims that 
relate to their areas of responsibility on social media and the Internet within two hours.193 
This negation must be communicated in 200 characters or less, and in two different ways 
e.g., a picture, a short text, a video.194  The reason for this is so that the rebuttals go viral 
before the fake news reaches an audience. Flemming Rose writes that ‘humour is also an 
important element in the government’s strategy, countering and minimizing manufactured 
outrage’.195 Also, the government has introduced a new curriculum in school that focuses on 
media competence.  
In terms of strict legal regulation, there are some laws that impose fines and prison time for 
anyone who spreads rumours.196 According to the Taiwan Security Brief: Disinformation, 
Cybersecurity, & Energy Challenges, both the executive and legislative branches of Taiwan’s 
government have introduced amendments to existing laws in order to limit the spread of 
disinformation.197 For example, the Disaster Prevention and Protection Act was amended in 
to impose penalties on those who spread false information about disasters.198 
United Kingdom  
In the UK, there is no legislation that addresses disinformation, but there are a number of 
government initiatives. For example, the National Security Communications Team (NSCT), 
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set up by the government has the purpose of tackling ‘communications’ aspects of threats 
to national security, such as disinformation.199  Furthermore, the NSCT delivered a campaign 
called ‘Don’t Feed the Beast’, the purpose of which was to inform the public on how they can 
detect disinformation before it goes viral.  
The government has also announced that the intelligence services are now responsible for 
identifying social media platforms that distribute misinformation and disinformation under 
the ‘Fusion Doctrine’ which provides the ‘Government must use the full suite of security, 
economic, diplomatic and influence capabilities to deliver our national security goals’.  This 
means strategic communications are to be considered with the same seriousness as 
financial or military options.200  
Moreover, the ‘Rapid Response Unit’ was established by Cabinet Office to help ensure that 
public debates are based on fact.  It is made up of ‘specialists including analyst-editors, data 
scientists, media and digital experts’ who coordinate with government media teams to 
ensure they are equipped to quickly respond to the current news environment. The role of 
the Rapid Response Unit is to ‘monitor news and information being shared and engaged with 
online to identify emerging issues with speed, accuracy and with integrity.’ The Rapid 
Response Unit works very closely with the NSCT to provide ‘highly visible public 
information’.201  
In February 2019, The House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee 
published its final report on disinformation and fake news in which it was recommended 
that‘clear legal liabilities should be establishedfor technology companies to act against 
harmful or illegal content on their sites’.202 It also recommended a mandatory code of ethics 
that is overseen by an independent regulator.203 The UK government then stated in the Online 
Harms White Paper that it will establish a new statutory duty of care on technology 
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New Zealand 
The New Zealand Government does not appear to have a statutory or self-regulatory regime 
to combat the spread of disinformation. On 31 October 2019, it was announced that the 
Minister of Justice, Andrew Little had plans in place to combat this issue at this year's 
election.205 This included a ‘special team within the Ministry of Justice to direct people to 
information aimed to be as accurate and neutral as possible, and to be on the look-out for 
any attempts to deliberately mislead the public.’ It was also stated that the Electoral 
Commission would look after the essential elements of running the referendums. The 
Electoral Commission would keep an eye to ensure that disinformation would not spread. 
However, the justice team would be in charge of the public information, websites, and will 
respond to public queries. Furthermore, the team would also have a monitoring role.206 
In January 2020, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern announced that the Labour 
Party will voluntarily sign up to Facebook’s new advertising transparency rules.207  Facebook 
had introduced authorisation and transparency measures so that election voters could see 
who is behind paid advertising online, how much they are spending and who they are 
targeting.208 These measures are mandatory in some other countries like the US, UK, Canada 
but New Zealand is voluntarily adopting them. The Labour party also guaranteed that the 
costings of all major new policy announcements released during the election campaign will 
be independently verified. The Government stated that it will continue to work on 
establishing an independent policy costing unit for the 2023 election.209  
Canada 
In May 2019, the Canadian Government launched Canada’s Digital Charter.210 This charter 
contains 10 points addressing a range of digital issues including privacy and data concerns, 
competition law concerns and approaches to digital disinformation. While this charter 
articulates a broad range of principles for digital safety, the final three points address digital 
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hate speech and disinformation.211 There is no definition of disinformation or 
misinformation in the Charter.212  
In January 2019, the Canadian Government announced a multi-prong effort to combat 
misinformation and disinformation. For instance, in relation to misinformation, it was 
announced that the Canadian Government would provide $7 million in funding for projects 
aimed at increasing public awareness of misinformation.213 The measures combatting 
digital disinformation were done in line with reforms to Canada’s electoral law that 
criminalised foreign funding of partisan advertising activity.214 This ad registry is effectively 
a gallery feature which archives all paid political or partisan content hosted during the 
election period.215 These measures required that digital platforms compile a political ad 
registry216 and placed strict rules and spending caps on third parties involved in partisan 
activity. In the lead up to the 2019 elections, Google and Twitter chose not to prohibit 
electoral and issue advertising. Google’s ban was in place until the election period 
concluded on 21 October, while Twitter was not accepting political and issue-based ads until 
the vote was called and the gallery feature was ready.217 These programs are overseen 
through a new Government cyber security department.218  
There are currently no Canadian laws that prohibit the dissemination of incorrect 
information.219 Nevertheless, the measures introduced in January 2019 build on the 
Elections Modernisation Act (2018), which requires further transparency from technology 
companies. These requirements recognise the role that digital platforms play in modern 
democracies, however they aim to encourage platforms to enforce policies to limit the 
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companies are required to be more transparent in their anti-disinformation and advertising 
policies regarding elections.221 So far, Twitter, Facebook and Google have committed to the 
gallery feature discussed above.222  
Czech Republic 
In April 2016, the Czech Interior Ministry announced the launch of the ‘Centre Against 
Terrorism and Hybrid Threats’.223 This Centre became operational on the 1st January 2017 
and is a twenty-person team with an analytical and communications role.224 The Centre aims 
to analyse trends in potential disinformation and communicate this to both the general and 
professional public.225 The Centre utilises digital platforms in order to spread awareness of 
disinformation issues occurring within the Czech Republic. For example, the centre has a 
Twitter feed, which it regularly updates to flag and debunk disinformation issues.226 As the 
Czech Government has classed disinformation as a potential threat to internal security, 
which falls within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, this Centre has been included 
in this Ministry.227 This highlights the focus of the Czech Government on disinformation as 
an issue aligned with foreign influence, primarily that of Russia and Russian linked 
organisations. These responses were enacted in the lead up to 2017 elections occurring in 
the Czech Republic.228 
United States of America 
The US has taken actions aimed at combatting state-based disinformation occurring in the 
international sphere. For example, the Global Engagement Centre, an organisation within the 
Department of State, was established with the aim of combatting state-sponsored 
disinformation.229 This agency is similar to the Disinformation Review, established by the 
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European Union.230  US State Governments have also introduced programs or other 
initiatives in over 24 states to improve media literacy.231 For example, in September 2018, 
the Californian State Government introduced measures to bolster media literacy by requiring 
the Department of Education to list instructional materials and resources for evaluating the 
trustworthiness of media online.  
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) owners of interactive 
computer services are limited from liability for content generated and posted by third parties, 
and have protection over the removal of content in order to uphold their terms of service 
under what is known as a ‘good Samaritan clause’. This provision was recently brought back 
into focus after President Trump signed an executive order declaring that platforms would 
need to demonstrate the ‘good faith’ element of their content moderation after his personal 
tweets attracted intervention from content moderators on Twitter.232 Tweets posted by the 
President attracted a relatively new fact-checking function, which flagged the tweets and 
provided links to fact-checking materials. Twitter also obscured one of President Trump’s 
tweets for violating rules around glorifying violence.233  
There are also various bills proposed in the US to regulate certain specific aspects of 
misinformation. For example, a Bill for the Deepfake Report Act of 2019 would require the 
Secretary of Homeland Security via the Under Secretary for Science and Technology (S&T) to 
publish an annual report for the next five years on the use of deep fake or ‘digital content 
forgery’ technology. Furthermore, the DEEP FAKES Accountability Act (2019) is aimed at 
combatting the spread of disinformation through restrictions on deep fake video alteration 
technology. The Honest Ads Act was announced in 2017,234 which is a bill that seeks to 
increase transparency by aligning online political advertising disclosure laws with those for 
radio and television. The bill would prevent foreign nationals and entities from purchasing 
political advertisements online, and improves transparency by expanding disclosure rules 
from just ads that explicitly endorse or oppose a candidate to include ads that mention a 
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advertisements.235 Although this legislation was re-introduced in May 2019, it has not been 
passed and some commentators have noted that it ‘faces long odds of becoming law’.236 
South Korea 
The South Korean Government has existing measures for blocking known disinformation 
originating from North Korea or North Korean aligned sources, and the dissemination of pro-
North Korean propaganda is criminalised.237 However, there have been limited moves to 
implement measures to prevent the spread of disinformation originating in the domestic 
media ecosystem. 
South Korean responses have focused on ‘fake news’, translated literally into Korean as ‘Ga-
jja-new-su’ and used as a popular term for ‘false or fabricated information, regardless of 
motive’.238 Bills put before Parliament do not share a common definition of fake news, an 
issue highlighted by the Parliament’s Science, ICT, Broadcasting and Communications 
Committee.239 South Korea has two existing media regulatory bodies, the Korean 
Communications Committee and the Korean Communications Standards Committee, the 
latter of which oversees online and social media.240 These two bodies can compel media 
organisations to issue apologies and corrections for media content that is deemed to be 
false. There have been some concerns raised that they can act as a form of government 
censorship as they are government organisations that have suppressed negative stories of 
sitting Presidents.241 
There are already some efforts to self-regulate fake news on digital platforms in South 
Korea. Online portals, including the two most popular, provided by Naver and Daum, require 
news providers to go through an evaluation process before they can display content.242 The 
Seoul National University (SNU) runs a fact-checking initiative partnered with the news 
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section on Naver, Korea’s largest internet portal.243 While this benefits from SNU’s reputation 
as an independent arbiter or truth, this initiative has struggled to gain traction with low levels 
of internet traffic.244 
Singapore 
Singapore recently implemented legislation that gives the Government a large level of power 
in policing disinformation and misinformation online. In May 2019, Singapore passed the 
Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act which criminalises the 
dissemination of false information online.245 This Act gives any government Minister the 
power to give directions regarding information that is deemed to be a false or misleading 
statement of fact.246 This can include that access to the content is disabled or a correction 
notice is affixed.247 The law imposes significant penalties for breaching these provisions 
where a malicious actor that shares false information can face a fine of up to $37,000 or five 
years in prison.248 This doubles to $74,000 or 10 years in prison if the sharing is done 
through an inauthentic online account or through a bot.249 This Act has been used at least 
two dozen times since its first use in November 2019. This Act includes provisions for digital 
platforms that do not comply with Ministerial directions. Failure to comply with an order to 
disable access to a site can result in a fine of up to $14,400 per day for platforms.250 
This Act has drawn criticism from human rights groups, political groups and technology 
companies.251 Importantly, it has been criticised for excessive restrictions on freedom of 
expression that can potentially be used to stifle criticism of the Government.252 In response, 
the Government has claimed the Act does not amount to censorship, as posts remain online 
with a corrections label affixed.253 The Act has also been criticised for its broad phrasing 
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which lacks a clear definition of false statement of fact, nor a definition of ‘public interest’ 
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Appendix 
A framework for information disorder  
In ‘Fake News. It’s Complicated’255 First Draft founder Claire Wardle outlined seven types of 




Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan further created a more nuanced framework as an 
organising structure of information disorder for the 2017 Council of Europe Report (COE) 
‘Information Disorder: Towards an Interdisciplinary Framework’.256 This output is now widely 
adopted by both scholarly and industry practitioners as well a guidebook by UNESCO.257 
Wardle and Derakhshan’s conceptual framework in the COE report258 outlines three 
components, each of which is also broken down into three parts including the types, phases 
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Figure 2: The Three Types of Information Disorder: Dis-information, Mis-information and 
Mal-information (Credit Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan) 
The three phases of information disorder (Figure 3) consider the cycles of creation of 
content and re-creation and re distribution of the content. Original messages may target an 
audience, but the reproduction and re distribution may be accessed by new audiences other 
than those originally intended. 
 
Figure 3: Three Phases of Information Disorder (Credit Claire Wardle and Hossein 
Derakhshan) 
 
A holistic view of information disorder is provided by ‘The Three Elements of Information 
Disorder: Agent, Message and Interpreter’ (Figure 4 below).  
Messages can be re-shared and produced differently to how the original agent intended. 
This framework highlights the importance of internet users in its focus on the ‘interpreter’ 
and suggests the importance of initiatives in areas such as media literacy where the 
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‘interpreter’ learns not to ‘share’ misinformation and disinformation. Training in digital and 
media literacy initiatives to help the public at large to recognise signals that point to 
problematic messages can be delivered via easy access methods259 and warrant further 
research and experimentation to allow digital citizens to consider their own roles and 
responsibilities in curbing mis-and disinformation.  
 
 
Figure 4: Three Elements of Information Disorder (Credit Claire Wardle and Hossein 
Derakhshan) 
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